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Abstract

With the rapid development of a computer network, our lives are already inseparable
from it. Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) is in use everywhere; more and more devices are connected
to the Internet, and many companies and individuals tend to store their data and information
online. Furthermore, it is now very convenient to communicate with each other through
email and text messages. However, widespread networks also provide more attack surfaces
for attackers. There are a variety of network attacks aimed at information theft. To better
defend against those network attacks, one needs to have a broad knowledge of existing
attacks. In this dissertation, we address four different types of attacks. (1) We first focus
on domain name security, as it is an essential component in a computer network. Attackers
can use Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA)-based malware to infiltrate a network and
eventually gain access to the network, leading to the loss of a company’s assets or personal
information theft. We propose a DGA-based malware detection framework for detecting
DGA-based malware to alleviate the threat to defend against this type of attack. The threat
data was collected from real-world network traffic over a year. The proposed DGA-based
malware detection framework consists of a two-level model that performs classification and
clustering and a time-series prediction model to predict future DGA domain features. (2)
We then focus on Wi-Fi security and countermeasures against Key Reinstallation Attack
(KRACK), which utilizes the serious weakness in the 4-way handshake of Wi-Fi Protected
Access 2 (WPA2) and aims at stealing Wi-Fi users’ information. We propose a SoftwareDefined Networking (SDN)-based detection and mitigation framework to defend against
KRACK. The proposed framework consists of two stages. In the detection stage, we monitor

vii

Wi-Fi’s network traffic and detect message 3 of the 4-way handshake, where message 3 is
a replaying transmission message launched by an attacker based on nonce resets. In the
mitigation stage, we update the forwarding rule in the flow table to redirect the attack traffic
and prevent it from going to the user. (3) To efficiently prevent users from being victims of
information theft, it is also essential to understand how users will behave when facing those
attacks. In this dissertation, we focus on studying user behavior when a user encounters with
phishing attacks. We propose two study designs: an on-site study design and online study
design. We not only collect personal background information through survey questions but
also design the necessary software to collect experimental data, such as time measurement
and mouse movement. We analyze which factors, such as intervention, monetary incentive,
and phishing types, play an important role in phishing attacks. Furthermore, we propose a
machine learning framework to help analyze collected data. (4) Since machine learning has
been widely used in defending against network attacks, we need to ensure the robustness of
the proposed machine learning algorithms and prevent them from adversarial attacks. Last
but not least, we explore adversarial examples for attacking the machine learning model
used to detect false data injection attacks in an in-vehicle network and build an Adversarial
Attack Defending System (AADS) for ensuring the robustness of the machine learning model
and securing the in-vehicle network.

viii

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1

Motivation
Network security has always been an important topic since the emergence of the In-

ternet. Many computer networks require the guarantee of network security, such as networks
used to perform transactions and communications among enterprises, governments, and individuals. Computer networks can be vulnerable to different kinds of attacks in different
ways [47]. In general, network attacks can be categorized into two types: passive attack and
active attack. In a passive attack, attackers can only intercept the information sent through
the network. However, in an active attack, attackers are capable of interrupting a network’s
normal function or gaining access to the network. In this situation, attackers can access
companies’ and governments’ assets or individual information, which can lead to disastrous
consequences [85]. Network security management can vary for different situations, such as
different security requirements, different types of networks, different kinds of attacks, and
attack surfaces. Since the Internet has a big effect on our lives daily, there are more attack
surfaces that can be exploited by attackers. In modern times, companies and individuals are
more likely to store data on the Internet, such as in a cloud. Attackers can perform different
kinds of attacks to steal personal information. Therefore, a broad knowledge of network
attacks can help enhance network security. With the rapid development of the Internet,
more and more devices are connected together. When an attacker infiltrates the network
from one attack surface, it can lead to the infiltration of the whole network and attacks on
connected devices. Therefore, ensuring the security of all attack surfaces is critical.
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In a computer network, the Domain Name System (DNS) is a naming system for computers and servers connected to the Internet. It has been an important component of the
Internet since 1985. DNS is essential for assigning domain names to each connected device
and mapping those names to Internet resources. It serves as a phonebook of the Internet,
translating domain names to IP addresses that are unique for each connected device. DNS
is vulnerable to a variety of attacks, such as a Zero-day attack, Cache poisoning, and Denial
of Service/Distributed Denial of Service (DoS/DDoS). Ensuring the security of the network
domain is very important for securing the network. A domain name is generally used to
identify the network domain. It is usually a string that consists of any combination of letters
and numbers. A Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) is an algorithm that periodically
creates a large number of domain names that are usually used as a communication point
between their Command and Control (C2) server [81]. Attackers can successfully use DGA
malware to blend into the normal traffic without being detected and gain control of the network. Thus, attackers can perform identity theft and steal company information. Detecting
DGA malware is a challenging task. The attackers always keep their back-end services on
the move, and the traditional method (using a blacklist) is insufficient to deal with a large
number of generated domain names.
Many other different attack surfaces allow users to perform information theft. With
the development of computer networks and the increasing demand for mobility and convenience, wireless networks have become widely used. However, the wide use has opened more
surfaces for attackers to launch attacks that aim to steal personal information. Wireless
Fidelity (Wi-Fi) uses a wireless network protocol based on IEEE 802.11x. All modern protected Wi-Fi networks are secured by the protocol called Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2).
Wi-Fi networks use the radio frequency (RF) technology to connect between a sender and its
receiver. There are no physical wired connections involved. Access Point (AP) is a crucial
component in Wi-Fi networks. In a Wi-Fi network, all devices are connected to an access
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point that broadcasts a wireless signal that allows compatible devices to detect and connect. Key Reinstallation Attack (KRACK) is a severe attack that can compromise Wi-Fi
networks because it utilizes a serious weakness of WPA2, which secures all modern Wi-Fi
networks [91]. Attackers can exploit KRACK to steal users’ personal information, such as
passwords, emails, and bank accounts. As an increasing number of mobile devices are connected to Wi-Fi networks, such as laptops, tablets, smartphones, smart TVs, and connected
cars, it is urgent to defend against KRACK and protect the users’ privacy.
Another harmful attack that affects our daily lives is a phishing attack. A phishing
attack is a type of attacks that are usually used to steal users’ personal information, such
as login credentials, bank accounts, and passwords [37]. In a phishing attack, the attackers
usually disguise themselves as trustworthy parties and deceive a user into opening emails
or text messages. Phishing emails are the most popular and common disguise for attackers
because of the extensive use of emails in our daily lives. A user is usually tricked into
opening a malicious link that will lead to the revelation of personal information or download
of malicious attachments that will lead to malware installation. Phishing attacks can be
spotted and prevented by vigilance on the part of the user. However, most people check
their emails without paying much attention to either the sender’s email address or the email’s
content. To better protect users from phishing attacks, it is important to understand how the
user will behave when he/she encounters the phishing attacks [56]. Studying which factors
affect the user is critical for protecting the user from phishing attacks.
With the emergence and rapid development of Machine Learning (ML) and Deep
Learning (DL), significant success has been achieved in computer vision, natural language
processing, and speech recognition. Machine learning has also been proven effective in network security, such as Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [17] and malware detection. Despite
the massive usage of machine learning in various domains, researchers have discovered that
machine learning algorithms are susceptible to adversarial attacks, such as Fast Gradient
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Figure 1.1: Illustration of the Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA).
Sign Method and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [86]. Attackers can manipulate the
input with a small perturbation, but this can result in an incorrect classification output,
thus causing machine learning algorithms to fail to work. For the machine learning applied
in security-critical domains, such as Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs), failure to
detect the attacks could be fatal. Therefore, when we use machine learning to defend against
attacks, the security of machine learning models should also be ensured.

1.2

Domain Generation Algorithm
The DGA is usually used by attackers to generate various domain names that allow

malware to communicate with the C2 server created by the attacker, as shown in Figure 1.1.
It can be used to manipulate the communication and blend in with normal traffic and avoid
detection. Once successful, the attacker will perform identity theft or gain control of the
whole network. Some popular DGA are CryptoLocker, Tovar, Dyre, Nymaim, and Locky.
Traditional malware control methods, such as blacklisting, are insufficient to handle DGA
threats. To efficiently detect DGA threats, one needs to look deeper into the features of
DGA generated domain names.
The idea is that domain names generated by a DGA include meaningful features
that can be explored to distinguish DGA generated domain names from normal domain
names [106]. Figure 1.2 gives an example of domain names generated by algorithms Cryp-
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Figure 1.2: Domain names generated by DGAs.
toLocker and Tovar. The DGA domain names are usually very long in length and consist
of random strings. These are useful features that can be explored to detect DGA domain
names. However, the DGA domain names that have shorter lengths are more challenging
to detect. In [5], the proposed detection model can dynamically detect DGA domain names
with any length. Both lexical and host-based features of URLs can be used to detect DGA
domain names [59]. The lexical features of the URL such as length, number of dots, and
special characters are considered in the URL path. NXDOMAIN is another useful feature
that can be used to detect DGA domain names. Many statistical features related to the NXDOMAIN strings, including the distribution of n-grams, can be extracted to identify DGA
domain names [9]. Using word segmentation to derive tokens from domain names to detect
malicious domains is discussed in [98]. The proposed feature space includes the number of
characters, digits, and hyphens. Based on the feature that DGA domain names have different
characteristics compared with normal domain names, the DGA domain names can be detected based on domain length comparison and character frequencies of the English language
alphabets [64]. Similar approaches based on DGA features can be found in [14, 34, 82, 107].
Both linguistic and DNS features can be exploited to detect DGA domain names [76].
Assume that DGA domain names have many significant features different from normal domain names. Thus, machine learning methods, such as support vector machines (SVM) and
neural networks [60], can easily distinguish DGA domain names from normal domain names.
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There also exist some studies trying to predict DGA domain names from past DGA domain
names [79]. DNS query is another feature that can be used to discover the pattern of varying
groups of DGAs [99]. In this method, the feature extraction step is not needed since deep
learning methods can be used directly for a real-time DGA prediction. Furthermore, DNS
similarity and patterns can be used to predict future DGA domain names [105]. Combined
with deep learning methods, no human effort is needed for analyzing features because they
can be learned automatically through deep learning [75].
The botnet that applies DGA to generate domain names also needs to be studied
carefully so that we can take countermeasures. Several studies have looked at understanding
and reverse-engineering the inner workings of botnets [36, 52, 83, 70, 84, 112].

1.3

Key Reinstallation Attack
Most modern Wi-Fi networks are secured by the WPA2 protocol that uses a 4-way

handshake. Several vulnerabilities of the WPA2 are presented in [90]. As an increasing
number of devices are connected to Wi-Fi networks, securing those wireless networks becomes
very important [6, 68, 110]. However, serious weaknesses have been discovered in the 4way handshake of the WPA2 protocol that allows attackers to perform key reinstallation
attacks (KRACKs) within the range of an access point to intercept personal information. In
KRACK, an attacker acts as a middleman and attempts to trick a user into reinstalling an
already-in-use encryption key. The 4-way handshake happens when the user wants to join
the network. The 4-way handshake is an essential communication between the user and the
AP to ensure that both have the correct credential. In the 4-way handshake, the AP first
sends out message 1 to the user, and the user replies message 2 to indicate if the user wants
to join the network. If the user agrees to connect to the network, the AP will send out a new
encryption key that should only be installed and used once. Usually, the user will install
this key and send out message 4 to the AP to indicate a successful connection. However, by
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Figure 1.3: A simplified format of an EAPOL frame.
applying KRACK, the attacker can prevent message 4 from being received by the AP. This
forces the AP to re-send message 3 with the same encryption key and the user will reinstall
the same key multiple times. Thus, the attackers can use this method to decrypt personal
information transmitted through the network.
Since all Wi-Fi networks use the 4-way handshake, this means that all Wi-Fi networks
could be affected by a KRACK attack. Almost all of the data and information, such as login
credentials and credit card information, that are sent by the user through the compromised
Wi-Fi network by KRACK can be decrypted. Furthermore, the data and information sent
to the user can be decrypted as well due to the network setup and the connected device. The
effects of KRACK can be found in [91, 95]. To better defend against KRACK, user behavior
analysis related to KRACK is presented in [31]. In this study, 379 people participated in
completing a quantitative survey and the survey showed that only experienced users have
updated their security patch to avoid KRACK. Most users’ passwords are weak and easy
to decrypt. Although one of the best solutions to defend against KRACK is to update
the security patch for each wireless device, in some devices, the security patch cannot be
installed or updated due to the end-of-life support. KRACK had made significant impacts on
the Internet because of the presence of many connected devices [88]. Besides stealing personal
information, KRACK may also bring potential long-term damages to the Internet of Things
(IoT) by compromising connected access control. This may impact a lot of connected IoT
devices and users.
Defending against KRACK is important for protecting the privacy of users. KrackCover is one of the wireless security frameworks that are designed to countermeasure KRACK
and provides suggestions to users [23]. The framework consistently monitors and captures
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all 802.11x messages and once the KRACK is detected, it will trigger an alert to warn the
users. This method is proven to be effective in real-world Wi-Fi environments, such as public libraries and coffee shops. The 4-way handshake messages are defined using the EAPOL
frame shown in Figure 1.3. It is possible to develop a detection scheme by closely studying
the EAPOL Frame [67]. The idea is, the Ethernet layer of the network packet is first extracted and then the IEEE802.11x header is extracted. Then, we extract the WPA key data
and check for duplicated message 3. Once the duplicated message 3 is detected, an alert
will be sent to the user to inform them of the attack. Several mitigation suggestions are
given to better defend against KRACK [94], such as using Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES), disabling fast roaming, manually updating Wi-Fi software, and actively monitoring
for rogue APs.

1.4

Phishing Attack
Phishing is a type of attacks that aim to steal user information, such as credit card

information and login credentials. It has become a widespread attack. In a phishing attack,
the attackers usually masquerade as a trusted party and deceive users into giving out private
information. It can be disguised as an email or a text message. Since email is widely used in
our daily lives, it has become the most common way of performing phishing attacks [28, 37,
97, 40]. In a phishing email, there are three ways to deceive users: suspicious sender’s email
address, suspicious links or attachments, and suspicious email contents, as shown in Figure
1.4. Most phishing emails created by attackers can be spotted with caution and awareness
of the characteristics of phishing emails. However, if an email contains important and urgent
information, the users will be more likely to ignore the simple clues that can be easily noticed
in a normal situation. Interestingly, the users who are more likely to be phished are those
who have more experience with emails [93].
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Figure 1.4: An example of a phishing email.
To better prevent phishing attacks, it is urgent to understand how the users will
behave when they encounter these attacks. Researchers have conducted many experiments
trying to understand why people get phished. One experiment recruited 22 participants
to perform the task of determining which of 20 websites are phishing websites [26]. The
results showed that the ignorance of security indicators has led to the most incorrect choices.
Another experiment revealed that individual email habits play an important role in phishing
susceptibility [92]. People with the habit of opening emails as soon as the notification
arrives, without even noticing they are doing so, are more likely to be phished. Distrust of
security indicators on the website is another reason why people are vulnerable to phishing
attacks [100]. Regardless of security indicators, people usually judge a website and an email
only by how they feel and how the website and email look [26].
Another approach to better prevent phishing attacks is to explore what factors can
contribute to improving people’s awareness of phishing attacks. For example, an intervention
can be an important factor for studying user behavior in phishing susceptibility [8, 18]. Even
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though there are some security indicators or warning notifications to alert the users, most of
them do not pay attention to the security indicators or do not trust the security indicators,
and some do not even understand what the security indicators mean. Furthermore, many
users do not even know what phishing is [58]. Therefore, educating users about the meaning
of phishing, trusting security indicators, and being aware of those security indicators is
urgent. Understanding how intervention can affect the users regarding phishing attacks is
important. Besides intervention, some other factors need to be carefully studied.

1.5

Adversarial Attack
ML and DL techniques have been found to be extremely successful in a variety of

fields, such as computer vision and network security. However, some studies show that ML
models are susceptible to adversarial attacks [86]. In an adversarial attack, an adversary
0

tries to manipulate original input x and create an input x , which is very similar to x, and
eventually leads to an incorrect output, as shown in Figure 1.5. In general, there are two
types of adversarial attacks: a white-box attack and a black-box attack. In a white-box
attack, the adversary has full knowledge about the machine learning model, such as the
number of layers in a neural network, information about the optimization algorithm, and
the parameters of a fully trained model. In a situation where the adversary can access the
internal parameters, such as weights, a very strong adversarial attack can be launched. The
black-box attack is the opposite of a white-box attack. The adversary has no knowledge
about the machine learning model. Instead, the adversary will analyze the past inputs to
find the vulnerability of the model.
Adversarial attacks can be found in both the training phase and the testing phase.
During the training process, adversaries can directly compromise the model by manipulating
the dataset used for training. There are two ways to manipulate the training dataset: (1) the
adversary can inject false data into the training dataset; (2) the adversary can modify the
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Figure 1.5: An example of adversarial attack.
training dataset. Furthermore, the adversary can corrupt the logic of the learning algorithm
during the training process. In this situation, the countermeasure strategy will be difficult
to design. During the testing process, adversaries attempt to force the machine learning
model to produce incorrect outputs. The information about the model is very important
for the adversary to launch effective attacks. Both the white-box attack and the black-box
attack are considered as testing phase attacks because they do not assume any influence over
the training data. There are several attack scenarios based on the attack surface, including
evasion attacks, poisoning attacks, and exploratory attacks [22]. An evasion attack is the
most common attack scenario; it only manipulates malicious data in the testing process
and does not affect the training data. Unlike an evasion attack, a poisoning attack is an
adversarial attack scenario that takes place in the training process by manipulating the
training data. The poisoned training data will compromise the whole learning process so
that it leads to a poor machine learning model. Another adversarial attack is called an
exploratory attack, which is a black-box attack. The adversary compromises the machine
learning model by trying to obtain more information about patterns in the training data
and the learning process. Some popular adversarial attacks are Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [33], Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [51], Jacobian Based Method [69], Deepfool [65],
and Carlini & Wagner (C&W) [19].
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Most existing studies on adversarial attacks focus on attacking images that have
proven to be successful [19, 51, 33]. However, not many experiments have been done in
other fields. Many studies heavily rely on the accuracy of their machine learning models,
especially in a security-critical field like autonomous vehicles; thus, the failure of machine
learning models can lead to disastrous consequences. For example, a well-trained machine
learning model can be applied in an autonomous vehicle to detect stop signs with high
accuracy. If the machine learning model is compromised, it will eventually lead to incorrect
decisions. The autonomous vehicle will, for example, ignore the stop sign and the ignorance
may cause an accident.

1.6

Contribution
The main contribution of this dissertation can be summarized as follows:
• To better prevent and defend against network attacks, one needs to have a broad
knowledge of existing attacks. In this dissertation, we study several attacks, including
DGA-based malware, KRACK, phishing attacks, and adversarial attacks, that are
closely related to our daily lives and can possibly lead to personal information theft.
We not only investigate how to defend against different types of attacks but also study
how people will behave when encounter with a particular attack.
• We design a machine learning framework to detect DGA-based malware, which is a viral
attack that allows attackers to infiltrate and gain access to a network (i.e., access the
asset of an enterprise). In the proposed framework, we first classify the DGA domain
names from normal domain names and then identify their generation algorithms.
• We design a wireless security framework to detect and mitigate KRACK for Wi-Fi
clients. The framework prevents Wi-Fi clients from leaking secret information such
as passwords, emails, and credit card information. The proposed framework utilizes
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the feature of separating the Software-Defined Networking (SDN) data plane from its
control plane, which makes for feasibility and easy management of the framework.
Furthermore, client authentication requests are monitored and inspected by an SDN
controller, which has a global view of the network.
• To efficiently protect users from personal information theft, we propose two study designs to understand user behavior when encountered with phishing attacks, which is
usually used to steal personal information. We study several factors, such as intervention and monetary incentives, to investigate how the user will be affected by them.
We not only collect participants’ basic background information and their answers to
the survey questions we have designed, but we also develop software tools to collect
experimental data, including time measurement and mouse movement. To understand
the collected data, we propose and develop a machine learning framework to predict
the performance score of each participant based on his/her profile.
• To demonstrate the limitation of the detection model applied to an in-vehicle network,
we implement two adversarial attacks for attacking the detection model. To overcome
these adversarial attacks, we propose an Adversarial Attack Defending System (AADS)
to effectively detect adversarial attacks. To be precise, we countermeasure three adversarial attacks, FGSM, BIM, and DeepFool, by adversarially retraining our detection
model iteratively such that we obtain a robust detection model to defend against both
attacks.
The dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we focus on the domain name
security aspect to protect personal or enterprises’ assets and present a machine learning
framework for DGA-based malware detection and prediction. Next, we study Wi-Fi security
to prevent identity theft and present a wireless security framework to detect and mitigate
KRACK in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we look into another widespread attacks, phishing, that
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steals personal information. We present two study designs to understand how users behave
when facing those kinds of attacks and apply a machine learning method to analyze the
collected data. In Chapter 5, we propose an adversarial attack defending scheme to ensure
the robustness of the machine learning model applied in an in-vehicle network. Lastly, we
conclude our work and present future directions in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2: Domain Generation Algorithm-based Malware Detection

This chapter1 focuses on domain name security and proposes a DGA-based malware
detection framework to detect and predict DGA-based malware.

2.1

Overview
Malware attackers attempt to infiltrate layers of protection and defensive solutions,

resulting in threats to a computer network and its assets [73, 24, 32]. Anti-malware software has been widely used in enterprises for a long time since it can provide computer
networks some degree of security to detect and mitigate malware attacks. However, many
anti-malware schemes typically use hashing, static string matching, and blacklisting methods [44]. These solutions are too simple to resolve sophisticated malware attacks, which can
hide communication channels to bypass most detection schemes by purposely integrating
evasive techniques. The issue has posed a serious threat to the security of many enterprises,
making it a grand challenge that needs to be addressed.
Many sophisticated malware attackers use either a static or dynamic approach to
connect to Command and Control (C2) [76]. For a static approach, everything is fixed. For
example, the malware has both a fixed IP address and a fixed domain name permanently (i.e.,
its domain name will not change throughout its lifespan). Thus, as long as this malware has
been identified as a threat, a simple rule can be applied to resolve this malware threat issue.
In a dynamic method, the Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) [81] has been commonly
1

This chapter was published in IEEE Access (2019) [55]. Permission to reproduce in the dissertation is
included in Appendix A.
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used to communicate back to various servers. The DGA is a sequencing algorithm that
is used to periodically generate a large number of domain names, which are often used
by malware to evade domain-based firewall controls. The generated domain names allow
malicious attackers to hide their C2 servers to make it difficult for the enterprise to identify
the DGA. The domains generated by DGAs are short-lived registered domains, and they are
easier for humans to identify, but harder for machines to detect automatically.
This study evaluates known DGA algorithms and malicious domains generated by
those DGAs. In this research, we investigate machine learning approaches, including multiple
feature extractions, classification, clustering, and prediction techniques, to understand these
DGA domains. We also design a Deep Neural Network (DNN) model to classify a large
dataset. Every day, there are many running applications and services in a network and their
computer systems may frequently query domain names through DNS [102]. We monitor
and analyze every DNS query to decide whether a particular domain and a specific query
originate from a DGA and which DGA it originates from. Additionally, we collect the data
daily over one year by using a real-time threat intelligence feed while conducting extensive
data processing [104, 103] from the Global Environment for Network Innovation (GENI) [61].
In this chapter, we first introduce an ML framework to identify DGA domain names
and develop a DNN model to classify the large datasets of DGA domains that we gradually collected. We then evaluate the proposed framework by comparing different machine
learning methods and a deep learning model. Specifically, our DGA-based malware detection
framework consists of four main components: (1) A dynamic blacklist consisting of a pattern
filter. The pattern filter is used to filter the incoming DNS queries to obtain the domains
from them. Those filtered domains are stored on the blacklist. (2) A feature extractor. It
extracts features from the incoming domains that are not in the blacklist. Those domains
will be processed in the next component. (3) A two-level machine learning model: the firstlevel classification and the second-level clustering. To identify DGA domain names, we first
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use various classification models to classify DGA domains and normal domains. Then, we
apply the clustering method to group domains sequenced by the DGA. (4) A time-series
prediction model: we propose a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to predict incoming DGA
domain name features in order to better identify the DGA domain names. The general goal
of our DGA-based malware detection framework is to determine which algorithm is employed
so that our proposed framework can prevent future communications from the C2.
Furthermore, we have gradually collected the data for over one year from Bambenek [12] and have obtained a large number of datasets from real traffic. To analyze
these data, we also propose a deep learning approach for large dataset classification. We
first build a DNN model and then compare it with our machine learning models. The comparison results provide us with a useful guideline for our future study in DGA detection and
prediction. In this chapter, our evaluation results show that we can achieve an accuracy
of 95.89% for the first-level classification. For the second-level clustering, we use the most
common label among the domain names in the cluster as the cluster label and calculate
the accuracy, which is 92.45%. For our HMM model prediction, we can further achieve the
accuracy of 95.21%. Our deep learning model for classification can reach an accuracy of
97.79%.
The main contributions of this chapter are summarized here.
1. We propose a DGA-based malware detection framework to perform DGA detection
and prediction. We first distinguish the DGA domains from normal domains and then
identify their generation algorithm. We also apply a time series model to predict DGA
domain features.
2. We introduce a two-level model that does classification and clustering to first classify
DGA domain names and then cluster the DGA domain names. The first-level model
(also referred to as the classification model) in the framework can identify DGA domain
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Figure 2.1: DGA threat models.
names with high accuracy. In the second-level model, we use an unsupervised DBSCAN
algorithm to group DGA domain names into different clusters [30, 77].
3. We design an HMM time-series predictor, which can be used to predict features to
match the current features of observed domain names. The prediction results give the
network a quick reference for blocking DGA domains. Because we do not check a DNS
query for a feature match, we eliminate the risk of communication with C2 servers
when conducting an inspection with the predictor.
4. We propose a neural network model to classify large DGA datasets. Different optimization algorithms are applied in our DNN model to obtain better accuracy. We
separate training data from validation data in this research to prevent overfitting.
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2.2

Problem Statement
The firewall blacklisting continually grows with increased sources of inputs. However,

sequences in a DGA may not be known to these inputs promptly. Moreover, for the malware
that communicates with an appropriate domain correctly, a threat actor must register each
respective domain name in the sequence to maintain the C2 or risk the loss of a node in the
distribution. Figure 2.1 gives a scenario for such a case.
Our research challenge is to classify accurately and cluster domains that originate
from known DGA-based methods, where we target a security approach that automatically
mitigates network traffic to unknown threats in a sequence.

2.2.1 Assumptions and Threat Models
Threat actors need a method to control and maintain the malware in a C2 environment while operating in an unnoticeable manner from network security systems. The success
of the malware does not require a domain to be registered or valid. A DGA may iterate
a sequence that results in an NXDOMAIN situation (unregistered). Blacklisting, establishing a DNS sinkhole, and implementing a firewall rule are standard techniques to prevent
a malicious network activity from malware and the signatures to implement these mitigation techniques are often provided by threat intelligence feeds. However, this research does
not utilize any pre-defined blacklisting that contains previously known malicious domains to
block traffic derived from a DGA in the initial stages of our analysis. Such features are built
over our observations. The main reason behind our implementation is that many threat
intelligence feeds and heuristic data often provide signatures to malware that has plagued
a network or public Internet. A sophisticated threat actor would implement or utilize a
0-day style malware (a malicious code that has never been seen or known to the public), and
therefore, blacklisting would be inappropriate for our analysis. Our proposed DGA-based
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Figure 2.2: An example of sample dataset from Bambenek Consulting.
malware detection framework aims to solve the problem of detecting DGA sequences using
machine learning techniques derived from observations in a network.

2.3

DGA-based Malware Detection Framework
The important components in this section are (1) domains extracted from DGAs; (2)

a DGA-based malware detection framework that encompasses multiple feature extraction
techniques and the models to classify the DGA domains from normal domains, cluster the
DGA domains, and predict a DGA domain features; (3) a deep learning model for handling
large datasets. This section introduces our data collection method and a DGA-based malware
detection framework for detecting DGA domain names.

2.3.1 DGA Data Collection
DGAs are numerous through various online samples that can be found from Github
repositories and Google searching. However, sophisticated threat actors intentionally generate the DGA domain names adaptively to assess current detection systems. Using real-time
active malicious domains derived from DGAs on the public Internet, we can measure the
accuracy of the proposed approach. Specifically, we collected real-time data from Bambenek
Consulting [12] over one year. The structure of the data is presented in a CSV format of
domain names, originating malware, and DGA membership with a daily file size of approximately 110MB; we have collected 64GB in total. Figure 2.2 demonstrates an example feed
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Figure 2.3: The proposed DGA-based malware detection framework.
of the collected data from Bambenek Consulting that gives domain names, malware origins,
and DGA schema.

2.3.2 DGA-based Malware Detection
We propose an DGA-based malware detection framework that contains three important procedures, as shown in Figure 2.3. First, the DNS queries with the payload are
considered as the input. Next, the DNS queries are passed to the process procedure, which
contains four important parts: (1) We first obtain domain names by using a domain-request
packet filter and then store them in a dynamic blacklist. If the input is a known domain,
we will skip (2) - (4) and directly go to the output; otherwise, we will proceed to the next
component. (2) Then, a feature extractor is used to extract domain features. (3) Next, we
apply the first-level classification to distinguish DGA domains from non-DGA domains and
the second-level clustering to group similar DGA domains. (4) Finally, we use a time-series
model to predict the features of a domain. After the domain name goes through the process
step, we will append this domain to the dynamic blacklist.
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The rest of this section discusses the four components of the process step in detail.

2.3.2.1

Dynamic Blacklist
The domain names are the only information we need to classify and predict in the

following steps. We apply a domain-request packet filter to filter out the irrelevant information, which is useless in our experiment, collected from the raw data. After filtering, we
obtain only domain names. In this process, we use the Gruber Regex pattern filter [109]. All
network traffic undergoes the filtering process. The filtered domain names are saved in the
dynamic blacklist [48], which is initially empty and will be updated dynamically and then
sent to the feature extractor in the next step. The dynamic blacklist can help us to reduce
unnecessary calculation; if a domain can be found in the dynamic blacklist, we can directly
go to the output step.

2.3.2.2

Feature Extractor
The feature extractor is used to extract features from the domain names filtered in

the first component. Each domain name is considered as a string. We use two kinds of
features: linguistic features and DNS features, to efficiently classify domain names. We start
with the discussions of linguistic features and then the DNS features.
There are six linguistic features: Length, Meaningful Word Ratio, Percentage of
Numerical Characters, Pronounceability Score, Percentage of the Length of the Longest
Meaningful String (LMS), and Levenshtein Edit Distance. The detailed description and
calculation of each linguistic feature are given as follows:
1. Length: We use |d| to represent the length of a domain name.
2. Meaningful Word Ratio: This feature measures the ratio of meaningful words in a
string (domain name). The ratio is calculated as follows:
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f1 =

n
X
|wi |
i=1

|d|

(2.1)

where |d| is the length of the domain name, wi is the i-th meaningful substring of this
string, |wi | is the length of i-th meaningful substring. Since DGA domain names usually
contain meaningless words, a small value of a ratio usually means that the domain could
be a DGA domain name and a higher ratio implies a safer domain name. We set the
length of each meaningful substring |wi | in the string to be at least 4 letters since
the majority of legitimate domain names have meaningful substrings with more than 3
letters. For example, for a domain name of iylvword, we have f1 = (|word|)/8 = 4/8 =
0.5. If a domain name is myproject, we have f1 = (|my| + |project|)/9 = (2 + 7)/9 = 1
because the domain is fully composed of two meaningful words.
3. Pronounceability Score: In the linguistic sense, pronounceable words usually consists
of many viable combinations of phonemes. The pronounceability score characterizes
the number of words that can be pronounced. The more pronounceable words, the
higher the pronounceability score. Because DGA domains usually contain fewer viable combinations of phonemes, they usually tend to have a lower pronounceability
score. Therefore, the pronounceability score can be a useful feature. To compute the
pronounceability score of a string, we utilize an n-gram lookup table. We calculated
the pronounceability score by extracting the n-grams score of a domain d. We choose
the substring length l ∈ 2, 3 in our computation and count their occurrences in the
English n-gram frequency text. For domain d, the pronounceability score is calculated
as follows:
P
f2 =

n − gram(d)
|d| − n + 1

(2.2)

where n is the length of the matching word in the n-gram list.
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4. Percentage of Numerical Characters: This feature measures the percentage of numerical
characters in a string. It can be simply calculated by:

f3 =

|m|
|d|

(2.3)

where |m| is the number of numerical characters.
5. Percentage of the Length of LMS: This feature measures the length of the longest
meaningful string in a domain name. The calculation can be written as:

f4 =

|l|
|d|

(2.4)

where |l| is the length of the longest meaningful string.
6. Levenshtein Edit Distance: It measures the minimum number of single-character edits
between a current domain and its previous domain in a stream of DNS queries received
by the server. The Levenshtein distance is calculated based on a domain and its
predecessor. For example, given two strings, “test” and “task,” the Levenshtein Edit
Distance between them is 2 because the characters that need to be edited are e to a
and t to k. Another example is that for “word” and “world,” the Levenshtein Edit
Distance is 1 because we just need to add an l after the r.
Besides linguistic features, we also use 33 DNS features, as shown in Table 2.1. Because DGA domains are generated very recently and live very shortly, they usually contain
less information than normal domains. For example, DGA domains tend to have the creation
dates within one year and their expiration dates are very soon.
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Table 2.1: DGA Classification Features
Features
Description
Feature Class (+/-)
Meaningful words
Ratio of meaningful words
Linguistic
+
Prounceability
How easy can it be pronounced
Linguistic
+
% of numerical characters
# of numbers
Linguistic
% of the length of the LMS Ratio of LMS in the string
Linguistic
+
length of the Domain Name How long is the Domain Name
Linguistic
Levenshtein edit distance
Min # of edits from last domain
Linguistic
+
Expiration date
If longer than 1 year
DNS
+
Creation date
If longer than 1 year
DNS
+
DNS record
If DNS record is documented
DNS
+
Distinct IP addresses
#. IP addresses related to this domain DNS
+
Number of distinct countries #. countries related this domain
DNS
+
IP shared by domains
#. domains are shared by the IP
DNS
Reverse DNS query results If DN in top 3 reverse query results
DNS
+
Sub-domain
If domain is related to other sub-ones DNS
+
Average TTL
DNS data time cached by DNS servers DNS
+
SD of TTL
Distribution SD of TTL
DNS
% usage of the TTL ranges Distribution range of TTL
DNS
+
# of distinct TTL values
Different value of TTL on server
DNS
# of TTL change
How frequently TTL changes
DNS
+
Client delete permission
If Client has delete permission
DNS
Client update permission
If Client has update permission
DNS
Client transfer permission
If Client has transfer permission
DNS
Server delete permission
If Server has delete permission
DNS
Server update permission
If Client has update permission
DNS
Server transfer permission
If Client has transfer permission
DNS
Registrar
The domain name registrar
DNS
+
Whois Guard
If use Whois Guard to protect privacy DNS
IP address same subnet
If IP address is in the same subnet
DNS
Business name
If domain has a corporation name
DNS
+
Geography location
If domain provides address
DNS
+
Phone number
If domain provides a phone number
DNS
+
Local hosting
If use local host machine
DNS
+
Popularity
If on the top 10000 domain list
DNS
+
Note: DN - Domain name. TTL - Time-To-Live. SD - Standard deviation. All the features used
in our model. (+/-): means that the feature is positively/negatively related to normal domains.

2.3.2.3

Two-Level Model: Classification and Clustering
To better understand DGA domains, we propose a two-level machine learning model

consisting of the first-level classification and the second-level clustering. In the first-level
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Figure 2.4: Two-level model of classification and clustering.
classification, we use machine learning classifiers to classify DGA domains and normal domains. Only the classified DGA domains will be sent to the second-level clustering. To
divide the DGA domains into several groups based on their DGA, we apply the DBSCAN
clustering techniques. The workflow of the proposed two-level model is shown in Figure 2.4.
1. First-Level classification: In the first-level classification, we use the features described
above and test with seven different machine learning classifiers, including Decision
Tree-J48, Artificial Neural Network (ANN), Support Vector Machine (SVM), Logistic
Regression, Naive Bayes (NB), Gradient Boosting Tree (GBT), and Random Forest
(RF) to find the best classifier. We use WEKA to test these classifiers and among
them, we notice that RF is the best at classifying DGA domains.
2. Second-level Clustering: In the second-level clustering, we apply the DBSCAN algorithm. Only the DGA domains obtained from the first-level classification will be used
for clustering. In our DBSCAN algorithm, we use the features described above to
calculate the domain distance and group the domains that are generated by the same
DGA together according to their domain feature difference. Let di and dj be two different domain names, where i 6= j. We first set i = 0 representing the first domain
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and then calculate the overall distance between di and all other domains. The overall
distance contains two parts: linguistic distance and DNS similarity.
The linguistic distance is computed based on the six linguistic features followed by the
following equation:
v
u 6
uX
distancez (di , dj ),
Dl (di , dj ) = t

(2.5)

z=1

where distancez (di , dj ) is the distance between each linguistic feature z within domains
di and dj . Let L be the set of linguistic features and K be the set of DNS features.
First, we form a weight matrix M ∈ R|K|×|L| , where |K| is the number of DNS features
and |L| is the number of linguistic features. The weight matrix M is used to represent
the relationship between K and L. The weight of an edge k → l is represented in each
element of Mk,l , where k ∈ K and l ∈ L. For each DNS feature k, we define:

Mk,l =

1
, for all l ∈ L,
|D(k)|

(2.6)

where |D(k)| is the cardinality of D(k), which is the subset of domains that are associated with the DNS feature k. To calculate DNS similarity, a matrix S ∈ R|L|×|L|
is applied. For each element, Sdi ,dj is the similarity value of domains di and dj . The
similarity value measures how similar the features are between two domains. Our inspiration is that two domains should have high similarity when they are associated
with the same DNS feature k. Thus, the similarity matrix of domains di and dj can
be computed by the weight matrix M . Let N be a column-normalized matrix of M :

Mk,l
Nk,l = P|K|
, ∀l ∈ L.
M
k,l
k=1

(2.7)
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Furthermore, the final similarity matrix is calculated by:

S = N T · N ∈ R|L|×|L| .

(2.8)

We can get the overall distance by combining the DNS similarity with the linguistic
distance. The calculation is shown as follows:

D(di , dj ) = Sdi ,dj + log(

1
)
Dl (di , dj )

(2.9)

where Sdi ,dj is the similarity value of domains di and dj . After the overall distance has
been calculated and based on the distance threshold, , we can get all points reachable
from di . If at least M inP ts are within distance  of di , then di is a core point. M inP ts
denotes the minimum number of points that are required to form a cluster. If di is a
core point, then a cluster contains di and all the points dj that are reachable from di is
formed. We set M inP ts = 3 based on the characteristic of our training data because
with M inP ts = 3 we can achieve a better performance of clustering.

2.3.2.4

A Time-Series Predictor
We build an Hidden Markov Model (HMM)-based time-series prediction model to

predict incoming DGA domain features. Before presenting the time-series predictor, we give
an example to show that after the second-level clustering, domain names are grouped into
multiple clusters shown in Figure 2.5 (a). We train on every cluster of domain names to
obtain a separate HMM model for each cluster. Figure 2.5 (b) shows an example of the HMM
training step. First, a sequence of domain names from training data is processed by a feature
extractor to derive a feature sequence that is used for training. After the training process,
we obtain HMM sequence model. Figure 2.5 (c) shows the HMM prediction workflow. In
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Figure 2.5: Procedure of an HMM-based Time-Series Predictor. (a) An example of
showing that domain names are grouped into multiple clusters. (b) An example of HMM
training procedure. (c) HMM model prediction.
this stage, we take a sequence of domain names as an input. We first extract the features
from the sequence of domain names to obtain a feature sequence. Then, we use the trained
HMM model to predict the future domain features. For the input of real-time domains, we
compare the predicted features with the features extracted from the observed new domain
query, as shown in Figure 2.6.
The detailed description of our HMM model is. We assume that each domain name
from a DGA cluster at time t is created by an unknown DGA, Zt , which is a hidden state. In
our model, we utilize the n-th order Markovian, where at any time t, the next hidden state
Zt+1 is only dependent on the past hidden states Zt−n+1 , . . . , Zt . In our model, n is the HMM
sequence length, representing the number of domain names in a sequence. A sequence of
domain names with a proper HMM sequence length can provide sufficient information from
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Figure 2.6: An example of the HMM model prediction.
the history to predict future features. The joint distribution of hidden state and observed
features can be factored as follows:

P (Z1::T , O1::T ) = P (Z1 )P (O1 |Z1 )

T
Y

P (Zk |Zk−1 )P (Ok |Zk )

(2.10)

k=2

where Z1::T denotes Z1 , . . . , ZT and O1::T denotes O1 , . . . , OT . Z is the hidden state. O is
the observed features. We can infer the probability of Zt+1 from the sequence of observed
features O1::t and past states Z(t−n+1)::t . The HMM sequence length is important because
the HMM predictor is affected by the sequence length of the given data.

2.3.3 Deep Learning for Classification
DNNs have achieved remarkable success in processing big datasets for a variety of
applications such as computer vision and natural language processing. In this section, we
review some basic concepts of DNNs and present our deep learning framework. DNNs can
be viewed as a deeper version of artificial neural networks (ANNs) with many hidden layers,
which include multiple nodes, also called neurons, in each hidden layer. DNNs can model
complex non-linear relationships. Optimization algorithms are used in DNNs to reduce loss.
To process a large dataset, we build a deep learning model to classify the DGA domains and
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Figure 2.7: The proposed deep learning model.
normal domains and compare our deep learning model with our machine learning methods
introduced earlier. As we know, the nodes of DNNs are not necessarily fully connected. In
our research, we only consider a fully connected DNN. Our deep learning model is shown
in Figure 2.7. We will present the parameters used in our DNN in the following sections.

2.3.3.1

Activation Function
A non-linear function is applied to each hidden layer to introduce nonlinearity. This

nonlinear function is also called the activation function, which transforms the value of each
node in the previously hidden layer before being passed onto the weighted sum of the next
layer. The Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) and the sigmoid function are the most common
activation functions that are used in many DNNs. The sigmoid activation function converts
the weighted sum into a value between 0 and 1 and it is written as below:

fsigmoid (x) =

1
1 + e−x

(2.11)
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where x is a hidden unit in the neural network.
The ReLU activation function sets the values smaller than zero to be zero and the
values greater than zero stay the same; it is expressed as below:

fReLU (x) = max{0, x}

(2.12)

The ReLU activation function often works a little better than a smooth function like
the sigmoid function and it is easier to compute. Thus, we apply ReLU in our deep learning
model.

2.3.3.2

Learning Rate
A learning rate is an important parameter in optimization algorithms. It is a hyper-

parameter that tells us how much we need to update a vector parameter, θ, whose elements
refer to weights in this chapter. When we have a lower learning rate, the steps along the
downward slope are smaller. In this case, we will not miss any local minima, but it will take
a long time to converge. The general equation is given as follows.

wnew = wold − lr · g,

(2.13)

where w denotes the weight, lr is the learning rate, and g represents the gradient of the loss
function. Typically, the learning rate is given by a user. Getting a better learning rate is
important. We will analyze the results using different learning rates in Section 2.4.2.

2.3.3.3

Optimization Algorithms
One of the important steps in deep learning is to minimize the loss and update those

DNN model parameters that can be learned, such as weights. The optimization algorithms
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can help us minimize the loss function. Because our DNN model is used for classifying DGA
domains and normal domains, the prediction input can be turned into a probability value
between 0 and 1. Log loss can be used to measure the performance of our DNN model. The
equation for calculating log loss is given as follows:

LogLoss = −(y log(p) + (1 − y) log(1 − p)),

(2.14)

where y is the labeled output. The output is either labeled as a DGA domain expressed as
a value of 1, or or labeled as a normal domain expressed as a value of 0. p is the predicted
output probability between 0 and 1.
Many optimization algorithms can be used. In this chapter, we introduce three optimization algorithms, Stochastic Gradient Descent [15], Adagrad [29], and Adam [45], and
make a comparison among them.
1. Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD): It is one of the most popular algorithms to perform
optimization in DNNs. It is a stochastic variant of the gradient descent algorithm to
minimize the loss function. SGD updates parameter θ, which is for each training
instance xi , and label y i . The equation for updating the parameter is given as follows:

θ = θ − lr · g(θ, xi , y i )

(2.15)

where lr is the learning rate, g(θ, xi , y i ) is the gradient of the log loss function for each
training instance, xi , and label, y i .
2. Adaptive Gradient Algorithm (Adagrad): It is an algorithm for gradient-based optimization. Unlike gradient descent, Adagrad can adaptively update the learning rate.
The learning rates will be updated based on the gradient. Therefore, it is more suitable for dealing with sparse data that contains a lot of zeros. At first, we update every
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parameter θ(i) using the same learning rate lr. Then, at every time step t, we use a
different learning rate for every parameter θ(i). The general equation is presented as
follows:
lr
g(t, i),
θt+1,i = θt,i − p
G(t, i) + 

(2.16)

where g(t, i) is the gradient of the loss function with respect to parameter θ(i) at time
step t. lr is the learning rate that is updated for every parameter θ(i) based on the
past gradients G(t, i).
3. Adaptive Moment Estimation (Adam): Similar to Adagrad, Adam can also adaptively
update the learning rates for every parameter. Adam exploits the idea of calculating
the momentum. The general equation is written as follows:
l
θt+1 = θt − p
M (t),
V (t) + 

(2.17)

where V (t) is the first moment, the mean of the gradients of the loss function with
respect to parameter θ at time step t. M (t) is the second moment that is the variance
of the gradients.

2.3.3.4

Training and Validation
In our DNN model, we separate a training dataset from a validation dataset for

overfitting prevention. We randomly select 80% of the ddataset for training and 20% of the
dataset for validation. We only train on the training dataset and valid with the validation
dataset. Other parameters used in the DNN model are epoch, batch size, and steps/batches.
An epoch is one iteration over all of the training data. The batch size is the number of
examples for a single update step. For SGD, it is usually set to be 1. Steps are the total
number of training iterations in one epoch. Thus, the number of steps S in each epoch is
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calculated as follows:
S=

N
B

(2.18)

where B is the batch size and N is all the training examples.

2.4

Evaluation

2.4.1 Experimental Setup
Our machine learning methods and the DNN model are implemented using some open
source tools, such as Tensorflow. GENI is a National Science Foundation (NSF) funded
heterogenous testbed solution. Leveraging high-performance nodes aids in the ability to
process large volumes of real-time data feeds in a timely manner. The nodes selected for the
evaluation consist of systems running: Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2450 @ 2.10GHz, 16 GB of
hard drive space, where the size can be manipulated based on reservation. Our DNN model is
trained on GAIVI, a computer cluster with largescale parallel computing capabilities. Each
node has the hardware: GeForce GTX TITAN X.
To evaluate our model thoroughly, we use five datasets of DGA domain data: CryptoLocker, Tovar, Dyre, Nymaim, and Locky from the latest DGA-feed [12, 41, 21]. We
collected the DGA domain names over a period of one year from May 31, 2017 to May 31,
2018. To provide a list of the normal control group domain names, we choose the top 1
million most popular Internet domains listed in domain punch [87]. 160,000 domain names
were tested in our DGA-based malware detection framework. We mix the control domain
names and the DGA domain names with a 1:1 ratio for the first-level classification. In the
second-level clustering, we use classified DGA domain names from the first-level classification
to cluster them into different groups of DGA domains. In the HMM prediction model, we use
the domain names from each cluster as an input. Thus, we build one HMM prediction model
for each clustering group of a DGA, respectively. To handle the large amount of data we
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Figure 2.8: Comparison among different ML algorithms. (A) Accuracy of different
machine learning algorithms (B) Classification time of different machine learning algorithms
collected over time, we build a DNN model for classification. We evaluate our DNN model
and compare it with our first-level machine learning classification. In our DNN model, we
have trained and tested on more than 1 million domain names.

2.4.2 Experimental Results
2.4.2.1

The Proposed DGA-based Malware Detection Framework
To find the best model for the first-level classification, we tested seven different ma-

chine learning models: J48, ANN, SVM, Logistic Regression, Naive Bayes, Gradient Boosting Tree, and Random Forest. We performed the 10-fold cross-validation on these machine
learning models. In each fold, 90% are used for training and 10% are used for validation.
Figure 2.8 (A) and (B) show the performance of different algorithms on the classification
of the DGA domains. We find that random forest has a better performance compared to
other machine learning algorithms. The average accuracy of the Random Forest is 95.47%.
Figure 2.8 (B) also shows that J48 is the fastest, with an average of 0.0144 ms to classify the
domain names. To see the accuracy of J48 associated with scalability, we test five groups of
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Figure 2.9: Classification results using J48. (A) J48 classification accuracy for each
DGA domain with different data sizes (B) J48 classification false positive rate
samples for each DGA generated domain with a total number of 1000, 5000, 15000, 20000,
50000 domain names. We find that J48 performs the best for CryptoLocker domain names.
Figure 2.9 (A) shows that the average accuracy of Cryptolocker is 98.22% and its
highest accuracy reaches 98.9%, while other DGA domains have accuracies ranging from
92% to 95%. As shown in Figure 2.9 (B), we also compute the false positive rate because it
is also an important metric, where lower is better. The false positive rates are 0.010, 0.012,
0.014, 0.015, 0.018 for CryptoLocker, Tovar, Dyre, Nymaim, and Locky, respectively.
To get a quantitative measure of success using the second-level clustering algorithm,
we calculate the accuracy score. The idea is that for each cluster, we go through each
domain name and check its label from the original data labels. We choose the most common
label among the domain names in the cluster as the label for this whole cluster. Then,
we calculate the accuracy for each cluster. Figure 2.10 (A) shows how the second-level
clustering algorithm performs on different DGAs. When we use both linguistic distance and
DNS similarity as the overall distance, its average accuracy is 87.64%, whereas if we only
use DNS similarity as the overall distance, the average accuracy is 89.02%. This is because
most of DGAs have very similar string compositions and lengths. These features cannot help
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Figure 2.10: Experimental results of clustering. (A) Clustering accuracy for each DGA
(B) Clustering accuracy for each two DGA groups
the clustering algorithm to identify similar DGA domains from each other. Furthermore, we
test the accuracy of clustering when more groups are mixed together.
As shown in Figure 2.10 (B), we test all the two group combinations for all the five
DGAs. When we mix Cryptolocker with other DGAs, the average accuracy for clustering
is 81.43% for all the features. However, when we use only DNS features as the DBSCAN
distance, its accuracy increases to 92.45%, which means that most Cryptolocker domains are
clustered into one group. Similarly, when testing other groups, we find that the accuracies
of clustering are 91.05%, 92.22%, 92.89%, and 92.57% for Tovar, Dyre, Nymaim, and Locky,
respectively. The result demonstrates that the clustering model can group the same DGA
domains into one group for a further time series model. Our clustering model can provide
high-quality training data for the HMM model. Higher accuracy for clustering can predict
future domain names more accurately.
Furthermore, we have extensively studied how the time series model performs when
making a feature prediction. We train an HMM sequence model for each cluster. To find
the best HMM model for each dataset, we test match accuracy and false positive for a
model with HMM sequence lengths ranging from 2 to 30. Figure 2.11 (A) shows that the
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Figure 2.11: Experimental results using HMM prediction model. (A) The match
accuracy for HMM models with different sequence lengths. (B) The false positive rate for
HMM models with different sequence lengths
peak accuracy is at a sequence length ranging from 14 to 15, where the average accuracy is
95.21% among them. Moreover, from the average prediction time analysis for each sequence
model shown in Figure 2.11 (A), we see a dramatic increase in prediction time when the
sequence length is greater than 15. It takes only an average of 1.02 ms to predict a DGA
domain features when the model length is 15. But, when the model length is 20, the time
will increase to 4.85 ms, which is a 3.75 times increase. On the other hand, the false positive
rate for these models also reaches the lowest at either lengths 14 or 15 in Figure 2.11 (B).
The average false positive rate we observed is 0.045 at length 15. The result demonstrates
that the HMM sequence model with length 15 has the best accuracy and very fast running
time. The performance of an HMM sequence model grants a fast response and the capability
to block DGA domains before it starts with a DNS query.

2.4.2.2

Deep Learning Enhancement
In the DNN model, the parameters include the number of neurons and hidden layers.

We test with different values of neurons and hidden layers and manually change them. Then,
we choose the best one based on the results of accuracy, log loss, and AUC. We first compare
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our DNN classification model with the first-level classification in our DGA-based malware
detection framework and the LSTM model described in [99]. We compare J48 and LSTM
with our DNN model. Figure 2.12 shows the accuracy comparison results among J48, LSTM
model and the proposed DNN model with a different number of domain names. Figure 2.12
(A) shows the accuracy when testing with a total number of 1000, 5000, 15000, 20000, 50000
domain names. The average accuracy for J48 is 95.89%, the average accuracy for the LSTM
is 91.12%, and the average accuracy for the DNN model is 96.43%. We can see that when
the number of domain names is 1000, J48 has better accuracy than the DNN model, and
at 5000 domain names, their accuracies are similar. Then, as the number of domain names
increases, the accuracies of the DNN model are better than the J48 model. The accuracy of
the LSTM model is lower than J48 and the DNN model, but it increases very fast. In Figure
2.12 (B), we continue to increase the number of domain names so that the total number of
domain names are 50k, 100k, 500k, and 1M. While the highest accuracy for J48 is 96.35%
at 1M domain names, the highest accuracy for the LSTM model is 98.77% at 1M domain
names, and the highest accuracy for the DNN model is 97.79%, also at 1M domain names.
We can see from the figure, as the number of domain names continues to increase, the rate of
increase for accuracies starts to slow down. LSTM is good at handling sequential datasets.
The input for the LSTM model is a sequence of domain names. The LSTM model has better
accuracy than the DNN model for a very large number of domain names, such as 500k and
1M domain names. However, the average accuracy of LSTM is 96.9%, which is lower than
the average accuracy of the DNN model, 97.58%.
We also compare the false positives among J48, the LSTM model and the DNN
model since it is a common measurement in machine learning. Figure 2.13 (A) shows the
false positives of J48, LSTM model and the DNN model testing with the total number
of 1K, 5K, 15K, 20K, 50K, 100K, 500K, and 1M domain names, respectively. The false
positives are normalized values among all positives. The smaller the value, the better the
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Figure 2.12: Comparison of accuracy among J48, LSTM, and DNN. (A) J48, LSTM and
DNN accuracy comparison with the number of domains ranging from 1000 to 50000. (B)
J48, LSTM and DNN accuracy comparison with a large number of domains ranging from
50k to 1M
performance. We can see that the false positives of the LSTM model drop quickly as the
number of domain names increases, but when the number of domain names is smaller than
50K, it has a worse false positive rate than the DNN model and J48. From the evaluation
results of J48, the LSTM model and the DNN model, we have observed that the DNN model
has better performance at handling all sizes of datasets than J48 and LSTM.
Besides the comparison of the accuracy and the false positive rate, we also compare
the Precision, Recall, and the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve
(AUC) between the LSTM model and the DNN model. Precision measures the fraction of
true positive instances among all predicted positive instances. Recall measures the fraction
that is detected as positive among all the actual positive instances. The ROC curve is created
by plotting the true positive rate against the false positive rate at various threshold settings.
The AUC measures the area under the ROC curve. The larger the AUC, the better the
performance. Table 2.2 shows the comparison of Precision, Recall, AUC and Time used in
seconds between the LSTM model and the DNN model.
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Figure 2.13: Experimental results of DNN model. (A) Comparison of false positives
among J48, LSTM and DNN. (B) ROC curves among the different number of domains,
50K, 100K, 500K, and 1M
Table 2.2: Precision, Recall, AUC, and Time Comparison
# of Domains
1K
5K
15K
20K
50K
100K
500K
1M

DNN
Precision Recall AUC Time(s)
0.7856
0.9926 0.9555
90.86
0.7691
0.9954 0.9667 263.57
0.8136
0.9914 0.9798 202.47
0.8330
0.9902 0.9819 259.12
0.8764
0.9882 0.9864 2376.65
0.8801
0.9907 0.9873 11496.49
0.8894
0.9903 0.9897 18185.41
0.8924
0.9914 0.9900 23154.35

LSTM
Precision Recall AUC Time(s)
0.1333
0.9891 0.910
44.45
0.1684
0.9863 0.9520 120.24
0.5570
0.9827 0.9720 362.20
0.6610
0.9724 0.9710 442.52
0.8167
0.9665 0.9770 1217.59
0.8216
0.9770 0.9830 2499.69
0.9218
0.9915 0.9970 12161.82
0.9652
0.9913 0.9990 22184.56

To overcome overfitting, we separate our training data from validation data and
calculate the log loss to measure performance. The goal is to have the validation log losses
match the training log losses as closely as possible. Figure 2.14 shows the training and
validation log losses over 10 epochs/periods. We chose the number of 50000 domain names
as an example. We can see that the validation log losses are very similar to the training log
losses and keep pace with the training log losses as the period goes on.
To better build and evaluate our DNN model alone, we chose the 50K, 100K, 500K,
and 1M domains to measure the ROC, AUC, learning rate, and optimization algorithms.
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Figure 2.14: Training and validation log loss over periods.
Figure 2.13 (B) shows the ROC curves of a different number of domains. The AUCs for the
number of 50K, 100K, 500K, and 1M domains are 0.9764239, 0.9873341, 0.9897, and 0.99,
respectively. The 1M domain result has the best AUC and the ROC curve is plotted in the
red line. The ROC of 50K domains is plotted in the yellow line and it has the smallest AUC
among them.
Figure 2.15 shows the evaluation of different learning rates. We chose learning rates of
0.00001, 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, and 0.5 to make a comparison among the four different
numbers of domains, 50K, 100K, 500K, and 1M. We evaluated their validation accuracies
and log losses. Figure 2.15 (A) shows the accuracy comparison of different learning rates.
They were tested with different numbers of epochs using early stopping by monitoring the
validation loss for 5 epochs with no improvement. The purple line, yellow line, blue line
and red line represent the 50K, 100K, 500K, and 1M domains, respectively. As the learning
rate increases, the accuracy generally also increases. At the learning rates of 0.05 and 0.1,
the average accuracies are higher than the average accuracies at other learning rates. Then,
the accuracy decreases at the learning rate of 0.5. The average accuracies at the learning
rates of 0.00001, 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, and 0.5 are 91.95%, 95.44%, 96.77%, 97.25%,
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Figure 2.15: Comparison of different learning rates. (A) Comparison of accuracies with
different learning rates, 0.00001, 0.0001, 0.001,0.01,0.05, 0.1 and 0.5. (B) Comparison of log
losses with different learning rate, 0.00001, 0.0001, 0.001,0.01,0.05, 0.1 and 0.5.
97.58%, 97.54%, and 97.15%, respectively. The average accuracy with a learning rate of
0.05 is the highest, which is slightly higher than the average accuracy at 0.1. Figure 2.15
(B) shows the log loss comparison of different learning rates. The average log losses at the
learning rate of 0.00001, 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, and 0.5 are 2.75182, 1.54855, 1.12041,
0.94418, 0.83415, 0.84775, and 0.99205, respectively. In our DNN model, we chose 0.05 as
the learning rate for all our other experiments.
Figure 2.16 shows the results of using different optimization algorithms, Stochastic
Gradient Descent, Adam, and Adagrad. Figure 2.16 (A) reports the accuracy comparison
among three optimization algorithms. We also test with four different numbers of domains,
50K, 100K, 500K, and 1M. The average accuracies for Stochastic Gradient Descent, Adam,
and Adagrad are 96.997%, 97.079%, 97.578%, respectively. Among them, the Adagrad optimization algorithm has the best accuracy. Figure 2.16 (B) shows the time used for each
optimization algorithm. The average times are 12188.16041, 12364.92334, and 11496.49419
seconds, respectively, for building the DNN model. Adagrad uses the least time in conver-
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Figure 2.16: Comparison of different optimization algorithms.(A) Accuracy comparison
among different optimization algorithms, Stochastic Gradient Descent, Adam, and
Adagrad. (B) Time comparison among these different optimization algorithms, where
Adagrad has the least time used.
gence, which is suitable for our DNN model. The average time for predicting one domain
name is around 27.87 ms.

2.4.3 Discussion
As seen in our experimental evaluation, the proposed DGA-based malware detection
framework has demonstrated an effective way to detect DGA domain names. We have evaluated the proposed DGA-based malware detection framework with the latest DGA domain
names from DGA-feed to classify and cluster DGA domains from these real-world data. Our
evaluation has shown that the RF classification algorithm performed the most effectively and
efficiently compared to ANN, J48, SVM, GBT, Logistic Regression, and Naive Bayes. We
have also tested the clustering accuracy. Our result has shown that the DBSCAN clustering
model we used can provide highly accurate clustered domains for a further time-series model
with an accuracy of 92.45%. We have noticed that the best accuracy we get from clustering
is the one where only DNS query features are used. The experimental results have proved
that a cluster of DGA domains usually points to several specific server IPs. DNS informa-
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tion of these domains is very similar and therefore clustering them with only DNS features
is very accurate. We have further evaluated different HMM models in terms of accuracy
and performance. We have found that the HMM model performs the best at length 15 with
a fast running time of 1.02 ms and a high match accuracy of 95.21%. We then evaluated
our DNN model and compared it with the J48 and LSTM. We find that the DNN model is
better for classifying all sizes of datasets. The average accuracy of the DNN model is 96.43%
and the highest accuracy is 97.79% testing with 1M domain names. We have also evaluated
the different learning rates in our DNN model. We have noticed that the best learning rate
for the DNN model is 0.05. The accuracy of the DNN model increases as the learning rate
increases. Then, after a learning rate of 0.1, the accuracy starts to decrease. This is because
the learning rate is used to control the steps to update the weights; if the learning rate is
too large or too small, it will result in either missing the local minima or converging too
slowly. Therefore, choosing a proper learning rate is very important in the DNN model.
Lastly, we compare the optimization algorithms used in the DNN model. We have found
that the Adagrad optimization algorithm has the best performance compared to Adam and
Stochastic Gradient Descent. Adagrad converges fast because it is suitable for sparse data.
In our dataset, some DNS features of the DGA domains are all zeros, so Adagrad is suitable
in our DNN model.
In our research, we extracted 6 linguistic features and 33 DNS features used in our
neural network model. However, when the attackers learn the patterns of our extracted
features, they could generate the DGA domain names based on the characteristic of the
features we extracted. For example, the attackers could utilize a dictionary to generate
DGA domain names with more meaningful words. To address this issue, we will build a
more effective neural network model that learns the features automatically for our future
work.
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Chapter 3: Key Reinstallation Attack (KRACK) Detection and Mitigation

This chapter2 focuses on Wi-Fi security and proposes an SDN-based detection and
mitigation framework to defend against KRACK.

3.1

Overview
WPA2 is a widely used protocol developed by the Wi-Fi Alliance to secure the ma-

jority of wireless networks. A WPA2 encrypted network can defend against intruders and
identity thieves by providing unique encryption keys when a client tries to connect to a network. However, researchers have discovered some vulnerabilities of WPA2 [50, 90]. WPA2
uses two types of keys, Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) and Group Temporal Key (GTK),
for encryption. A PTK is established through the 4-way handshake and it is unique for
each client. A GTK is randomly generated by Access Point (AP) and it is shared among
all clients. Such APs can be implemented as routers, modems, or gateways. Attackers can
manipulate the GTK to launch attacks since it is used as an encryption key in the AP
and a decryption key for clients. Attackers can inject forged data traffic through a GTK
to all associated clients. Therefore, it possibly results in several types of attacks, such as
man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks and denial of service (DoS) attacks [89].
In 2017, researchers discovered a serious flaw in the WPA2 protocol that allows attackers within the range of an AP to perform KRACK [91]. To be precise, attackers can
intercept and steal a client’s information, such as passwords, emails, and credit card numbers,
2
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that should be safely encrypted. In some scenarios, it is also possible for attackers to inject
malicious contents or manipulate data on the website that a client is visiting. The correct
implementation of WPA2 is likely to be affected since this weakness is in the Wi-Fi standard
itself. Furthermore, the researchers have generalized attacks and investigated devices that
are still affected by KRACK [95]. Moreover, they have recently discovered an easier way to
attack unpatched devices and bypass the Wi-Fi’s official countermeasure against KRACK.
In order to alleviate this issue, a framework called KrackCover was proposed to detect KRACK [23]. It will send an alert to the client once the attack has been detected.
The experiment is conducted in a public network, such as coffee shops and libraries. This
approach can effectively warn clients of potential threats of KRACK.
After a careful investigation of KRACK, we propose a Software-Defined Networking
based detection and mitigation framework to defend against KRACK. SDN is an emerging
paradigm with the benefits of network visibility and network device programmability and it is
widely used in network security. With the separation of the control plane and infrastructure
plane, an SDN network is easily managed by a centralized SDN controller since it has a global
view of the whole network. Many researchers have adopted SDN in network management
and network security [78, 108, 101].
The proposed framework consists of two main modules: detection and mitigation.
Specifically, we apply SDN to a Wi-Fi AP where Wi-Fi’s short-haul communications are
converted into long-haul communications to the Internet using SDN. The conversion communication data are processed by an SDN switch under the management of an SDN controller. In the detection module of the proposed framework, the SDN controller inspects
each incoming Wi-Fi network request where the duplicated message 3 of the 4-way handshake will be detected when an attacker launches KRACK. We configure an AP to function
as an OpenFlow vSwitch (OVS), which is monitored and managed by the SDN controller.
The detection module is deployed on the SDN controller since the controller has a global
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view of the network. First, the SDN controller monitors all the traffic going through the
network. Then, if an attacker launches KRACK to target a victim, the detection module
can detect this attack by checking duplicated message 3 of the 4-way handshake. Next, once
the attack has been detected, the mitigation module will update the entries of the flow table
in the OVS to redirect the traffic flows to a splash portal, which is a place to store attack
traffic. The proposed framework can effectively defend against KRACK based on the SDN
architecture.
The main contributions are summarized as follows.
1. We propose a wireless security framework to detect and mitigate KRACK for Wi-Fi
clients. The framework prevents Wi-Fi clients from leaking secret information such as
passwords, emails, and credit card information.
2. The proposed framework employs SDN, where client authentication requests are monitored and inspected by an SDN controller. This framework can be easily extended to
countermeasure other wireless security attacks besides KRACK.
3. The proposed framework utilizes the feature of separating the SDN data plane from
its control plane, which makes for feasibility and easy management of the framework.
Furthermore, because the SDN controller has a global view of a Wi-Fi network, the
proposed framework will be applicable to a large-scale Wi-Fi network for a variety of
real-world applications.
4. To understand the scalability of the proposed framework, we develop a queueing-based
mathematical model to characterize client authentication requests in the detection
and mitigation modules, respectively. We investigate how many clients can be handled
when the processing capacity of an SDN controller is fixed. The resulting analysis gives
an insight into the scalability of the proposed framework.
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3.2

The Threat Model
KRACK utilizes the flaws of the Wi-Fi standard protocol to reinstall an already-in-

use key. It aims to attack the 4-way handshake of the WPA2 protocol by manipulating
and replaying cryptographic handshake messages. When a client attempts to connect to a
protected network through an AP, the handshake will be performed to verify the credentials
of both the AP and the client. In this chapter, we focus on the Linux/Android vulnerability
due to the large magnitude of devices that are affected by it. KRACK occurs in the following
manners in details.
1. An attacker waits for a client/victim to connect or reconnect to a Wi-Fi network AP.
For the latter situation, an attacker transmits a specially crafted packet to dissociate
the client from the AP, also known as a de-authentication attack. Before a client
connects to the AP, the attacker leverages a separate rogue AP that falsely broadcasts
the SSID of a legitimate Wi-Fi network. Client devices that connect and associate with
the attacker’s rogue AP present the ability for the attacker to execute a MitM attack.
2. The attacker first detects the client’s connection attempt by capturing the wireless
communication exchange for a WPA2 handshake packet. The attacker then proceeds
to stage a rogue Wi-Fi network with a matching SSID to trick the victim’s machine into
associating with the attacker’s AP. Commonly, wireless devices connect to an AP with
the strongest signal strength unless designated or fixed by a user-defined parameter
such as an operating system setting or a driver configuration. A rogue AP for this
attack case often distinguishes itself from other Wi-Fi APs through the signal strength
metric with the intention of luring a victim machine to connect to the rogue Wi-Fi
network. A MitM may be accomplished by an attacker once a victim connects to
a rogue Wi-Fi network through the attacker forwarding traffic between a legitimate
network and the victim, transparently.
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3. As the new MitM, the attacker then listens for the WPA2 handshake. During this
handshake, the third message of the handshake exchanges a key nonce that the attacker will withhold. The attacker will take these packets and replay them multiple
times to the victim or a target machine. Because of a protocol implementation bug
in Linux/Android devices, the WPA2 key will be cleared at which point the attacker
installs an all zero key or no encryption.
The effects of KRACK can be disastrous, as other forms of encryption such as SSL/TLS may be removed in combination with well-known methods. For this reason, an
attacker may obtain any information, such as credit card numbers, personally identifiable
information, or authentication credentials with minimal effort.

3.3

An SDN-based Framework to Detect and Mitigate KRACK
We propose an SDN-based solution to detect and mitigate KRACK. The main mod-

ules in this framework are detection and mitigation. Besides these two main modules, we
also implement an attack module in this framework. The standard Wi-Fi protocol uses the
4-way handshake to generate a session key, but it is vulnerable to key reinstallation attacks.
Figure 3.1 shows the architecture of the proposed framework. While the solid black lines
represent the normal traffic going through the wireless network, the red dotted lines show
network traffic generated by attackers, and the blue dashed lines indicate the wireless traffic
with detection and mitigation. The SDN controller has a global view of this network so that
it can monitor and manage client authentication requests.
Initially, because of the vulnerability of the 4-way handshake, an attacker may attack
the client easily through the AP once the client is connected to this network. When we adopt
the SDN paradigm, the SDN controller will monitor the traffic going through the network.
The AP functions as the OVS since all end devices are connected to it. The detection and
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Figure 3.1: KRACK detection and mitigation framework.
mitigation modules are deployed on the SDN controller in order to take advantage of the
controller. As shown in the blue dashed lines of Figure 3.1, labels 1, 2, 3, and 4 represent
four different actions in this framework, respectively. They are discussed in detail as follows.
Label 1 represents an attacker launching the attack through AP. Label 2 indicates that the
detector on the SDN controller will a) monitor the traffic, b) detect KRACK, and c) mitigate
the attack traffic by updating the flow table. Label 3 means that after the SDN controller
updates the entries of the flow table, the attack traffic flows will be redirected to a splash
portal. Label 4 means that if the traffic flow is not detected as KRACK, it will be sent to
the clients. To be precise, we divide the framework into three stages: 1) attack stage, 2)
detection stage, and 3) mitigation stage.

3.3.1 Attack Stage
Most Wi-Fi networks are protected by some version of WPA or WPA2, which relies
on the 4-way handshake. However, the design of the 4-way handshake has serious flaws that
make it vulnerable to key reinstallation attacks. In the attack stage, we perform KRACK,
proposed in [91, 95]. A client/victim is tricked into reinstalling an already-in-use key so that
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Figure 3.2: The procedure of attacking the 4-way handshake.
the attacker can steal the victim’s personal information and even inject false data. KRACK
is achieved by replaying and manipulating message 3 of the 4-way handshake.
The attack procedure is shown in Figure 3.2. When a client is trying to connect to a
network, the 4-way handshake will be executed. The 4-way handshake provides mutual
authentication based on the Pairwise Master Key (PMK) (a shared master secret) and
negotiates a PTK. The PTK is derived from the PMK. The supplicant (client) receives
message 1 and sends message 2 to the authenticator (AP). The supplicant will install the
PTK and the GTK after receiving message 3 from the authenticator. A data-confidentiality
protocol will then be used to encrypt normal data frames after installing the PTK and
the GTK. If the supplicant does not send message 4 to the authenticator as a response of
acknowledgment, the authenticator will think that message 3 may have been dropped or lost.
Therefore, the authenticator will retransmit message 3 to the supplicant. As a result, the
supplicant will receive message 3 multiple times. Each time the supplicant receives message
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3, the same PTK will be reinstalled and the associated parameters, such as receive packet
number (i.e., replay counter) and incremental transmit packet number (i.e., nonce), are reset
to their initial values.
In KRACK, an attacker will first establish a MitM position between the supplicant
and the authenticator. The attacker uses this MitM position to prevent message 4 from
arriving at the authenticator. Then, the attacker can utilize the retransmission manner of
message 3 to reinstall an already-in-use PTK and force reset the value of nonce and the
replay counter. By reusing the nonce and the replay counter, the attacker can attack the
data-confidentiality protocol, such as replay, as well as decrypt and forge the packets. The
above can pose significant threats to users’ privacy.

3.3.2 Detection Stage
Since every message in the 4-way handshake is defined using EAPOL frames, we
can extract useful information from EAPOL frames to detect the duplicated packets. As
shown in Figure 3.3 (a), the header defines the n-th message in the handshake. The replay
counter field is used to count the replay frames. When the authenticator sends a message
to the supplicant, the replay counter will be increased by one. If the supplicant receives
the message and replies to the authenticator, the same replay counter is used. The nonce
field can be used to detect the reuse of nonce since it transmits the new session key that is
derived from the random nonces generated by the supplicant and authenticator. Therefore,
the replay counter field and nonce field are extremely helpful in detecting the reinstallation
of an already-in-use key. To be precise, if message 3 is retransmitted, a duplicated nonce
will be transmitted and we just need to check if there is a reuse of nonce.
The SDN controller will monitor all the traffic going through the network by the
wireless interface. To detect KRACK, the traffic packets need to be captured and filtered
so that only EAPOL packets are left. The detection procedure is shown in Figure 3.3 (b).
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Figure 3.3: Detection stage. (a) Simplified Layout of an EAPOL Frame (b) Procedure of
Detection Stage
First, the Ethernet layer is extracted. Then, the IEEE802.1x header is extracted from the
Ethernet layer. Next, WPA key data is extracted from the IEEE802.1x header. Lastly, we
analyze the WPA key data and check for the duplicate message 3 from EAPOL packets. If
the reuse of nonce is detected, it will proceed to the mitigation stage. If there is no duplicated
message 3, then we will examine the next traffic flow.

3.3.3 Mitigation Stage
In an SDN network, the controller manages the traffic by adding rules in the flow table
in the OVS. The controller communicates with the OVS through a secure channel, which is
defined by the OpenFlow Protocol. An entry of the flow table consists of three important
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fields: a header field, an action field, and a statistic field. The header field is used to define
the flow. The statistic field is used to store the network information of the flow, such as a
time-stamp of the packet that was last seen and the number of flows forwarded. The path of
a flow can be directed in the action field. The flow can be handled by the following actions:
forwarding to a destination port or ports, encapsulating and forwarding to the controller, or
forwarding through the switch’s normal processing pipeline.
In our study, we set up a splash portal to store attack traffic. We utilized the characteristic of the SDN network to update the flow rules in the flow table to prevent the attack
traffic flows from being forwarded to the client. When KRACK is detected in the detection
stage by checking the duplication of message 3, it will proceed to the mitigation stage. In
this stage, we add a flow rule in the OVS to forward the attack traffic to the splash portal
instead of forwarding it to the client. If there is no attack detected, the traffic flow will be
forwarded through its normal path. In this way, the attack traffic will not be forwarded to
the client. Meanwhile, we will send an alert to the client to warn them about the attack.

3.3.4 Hardware Configuration
In this study, the experiment was set up in a lab environment. We constructed an
SDN network to detect and mitigate KRACK. We used a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B, which
has the specification of a Quad Core 1.2GHz Broadcom BCM2837 64bit CPU, as the SDN
controller. We choose Raspberry Pi for the purpose of portability; it is easily carried around
and can be easily connected to other devices, such as a laptop. We utilized a wireless
antenna, an Alfa AWUS036NHA High Gain, to capture the nearby traffic. We set up a
Floodlight [62] controller to monitor and update the flow rules. Floodlight controller is an
open-source, Java-based OpenFlow controller, which provides many implementations that
can be used to easily manage the network, such as updating the entries in the flow table.
The detection and mitigation scripts were deployed on the SDN controller. A TP-Link AC
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Figure 3.4: Hardware configuration for the proposed framework.
1750 Router was used as the AP and was configured as an OVS. A desktop with 16GB of
memory and a quad-core processor were used to host two virtual machines: one was used
as an attack machine and the other was used as a splash portal. The attack machine uses a
Kali Linux operating system with 2G of memory and a dual-core processor. We utilized two
wireless antennas, a TP-Link WN722n v1 and an Alfa AWUS036NHA High Gain, to launch
KRACK. The splash portal uses a Ubuntu operating system with a single-core processor.
Lastly, we adopted a Samsung Galaxy S7 Edge to connect to the SDN wireless network
with WPA2 encryption to test our experiment setup. The experimental setup and hardware
configuration is shown in Figure 3.4.

3.3.5 Scalability Analysis
To better understand the scalability of the proposed framework in the real world,
we employ queueing theory to characterize client authentication requests in detection and
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Figure 3.5: Scalability model.
mitigation modules where each module is modeled as an M/M/c/K queue shown in Figure
3.5. It is assumed that each authentication request arrival in each module follows a Poisson
distribution and a service rate for the SDN controller to process authentication requests
follows exponential distribution in each module. Here, c represents the number of cores on
the SDN controller. K is the buffer size of the SDN controller in each module where c1
and K1 are for the detection module, while c2 and K2 are used for the mitigation module.
Furthermore, to be precise, let λ1 and µ1 represent the arrival rate and the service rate of
the first queue, which models the detection stage, as well as λ2 and µ2 being used for the
second queue, which models the mitigation module. Ta1 is the time when a client starts to
connect to the network. Ts1 and Ts2 are the time at which SDN starts to process detection
and mitigation, respectively. Td1 and Td2 are the time at which SDN finishes detection and
mitigation processes, respectively. Based on the detection results, α clients are sent to the
second M/M/c/K queue for mitigation and 1 − α clients go directly to the Exit. For those
α clients that proceed to the mitigation stage, the arrival time is denoted by Ta2 , which is
equal to Td1 . The Exit time Te of those α clients is equal to Td2 . For 1 − α clients who go
directly to the Exit, the Exit time Te is exactly equal to Td1 . The total time for processing
one client is calculated as Te − Ta1 . The total time represents a sum of the detection time
and mitigation time. In the scalability model, we have the following assumptions:
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1. Every user who accesses the network follows a Poisson distribution with the rate λ1 .
2. Both detection time and mitigation time follow an exponential distribution with the
rate µ1 and µ2 , respectively.
3. The model assumes that the interarrival time of clients, the detection time, and the
mitigation time are independent.
4. The model can use c cores so SDN can process authentication requests with detection
and mitigation simultaneously and with buffer sizes of K1 and K2 .
5. The queue discipline is the first in first out (FIFO). That is, the clients are served in
order of arrival.
6. λ2 = αλ1 .
To see the effects of setting a different arrival rate, λ1 , the number of cores, c1 and c2 ,
and the buffer sizes, K1 and K2 , on the total time, we tested the system with different setups. To evaluate the maximum number of clients the framework can handle within a desired
average total time that is determined by each application requirement, we formulated an optimization problem. Let T (λ1 , µ1 , c1 , K1 , α, µ2 , c2 , K2 ) be the total time of both the detection
and mitigation processes, T1 (λ1 , µ1 , c1 , K1 ) be the time from the moment the client joins the
network to the moment the client exits the detection phase, and T2 (λ2 , µ2 , c2 , K2 ) be the time
from the moment the client exits the detection phase to the moment the client exits the mitigation phase. For notation simplicity, T (λ1 , µ1 , c1 , K1 , α, µ2 , c2 , K2 ), T1 (λ1 , µ1 , c1 , K1 ), and
T2 (λ2 , µ2 , c2 , K2 ) are written as T , T1 , and T2 , respectively. Last, let T0 be the maximum
total time that is acceptable for the clients. For given service rate µ1 and µ2 , the number of
cores c1 and c2 , buffer sizes K1 and K2 , and the probability α, the maximum arrival rate is
determined by solving for λ1 in the following optimization problem:
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Algorithm 1: Scalability Model Optimization Algorithm
Input: µ1 , µ2 , α, c1 , c2 , K1 , K2 , 4
Output: λmax
1: λmax ← c1 µ1 − 4
2: Tmax ← T (λmax , µ1 , c1 , K1 , α, µ2 , c2 , K2 )
3: while Tmax > T0 do
4:
λmax ← λmax − 4
5:
Tmax ← T (λmax , µ1 , c1 , K1 , α, µ2 , c2 , K2 )
6: end while

arg maxλ1 >0 T (λ1 , µ1 , c1 , K1 , α, µ2 , c2 , K2 )
subject to T ≤ T0 , and

λ1
c1 µ1

(3.1)

< 1, where T = T1 + αT2 .

Since λ1 is bounded by the inequalities λ1 < c1 µ1 and λ1 > 0, the search space for
maximum λ1 that satisfies the condition T < T0 is 0 < λ1 < c1 µ1 . Furthermore, given
µ1 , c1 , K1 , α, µ2 , c2 , and K2 , T is an increasing function of λ1 since the first derivative of T
with respect to λ1 is increasing for 0 < λ1 < c1 µ1 . Therefore, we can find the maximum
λ1 by a simple while loop, as shown in Algorithm 1. Starting with λmax = c1 µ1 − 4 for
some specified step size 4, we can then calculate the corresponding average total time T .
If T < T0 , we are done; otherwise, reduce λmax by 4, calculate the average total time with
updated λmax value, and check if T < T0 . This process continues until we find a λmax value
that satisfies the condition.

3.4

Evaluation
To run the experiment, we first started the Floodlight in the background to monitor

the traffic going through the network. Next, we configured the AP to enable OVS functions.
We have adopted an online KRACK detector in courtesy of secureingsam’s Github script [74]
and modified it to meet the goal in our experiment. We have also written a mitigation script
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Table 3.1: Times Recorded in the Experiment
Script

Metrics Description
Atk1 Time at which
Attack Script
Atk2 Time at which
Atk3 Time at which
Det1 Time at which
Detection Script
Det2 Time at which
Det3 Time at which
Mitigation Script M tg Time at which

attack script begins
first message 3 was sent from authenticator
the duplicated message 3 was sent from authenticator
first message 3 was detected
the duplicated message 3 was detected
mitigation starts
mitigation ends

to update the flow table and integrated it with the modified detection script. The attack
script is adopted from [91] with little modification. We have also modified both the attack
script and the detection script to keep track of important time metrics, as shown in Table
3.1. The detection script makes use of raw sockets to allow for detailed packet analysis. The
analysis takes place byte by byte, ensuring the packet meets the criteria of the message 3
in the WPA2 handshake before continuing. Finally, once we capture the first message 3,
the key nonce is stored for future comparison against other packet key nonces. Success at
the detection stage leads to the mitigation stage, and the controller will reroute the attack
traffic to the splash portal by updating the flow table.

3.4.1 Experimental Results
The time metrics recorded in the attack script, detection script, and mitigation script
and their description are shown in Table 3.1. There are three time metrics in the attack
script, three time metrics in the detection script, and one time metric in the mitigation
script. By analyzing the time metrics recorded in the experiment, we can obtain some
important time measurements such as detection time and mitigation time. We extract six
time measurements in total to evaluate our detection and mitigation scheme. The detailed
description of these six time measurements are given as follows:
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1. KRACK Detection Time: It measures the time at which KRACK is detected. It is
the time from the moment the authenticator sent the duplicated message 3 to the
moment the duplicated message 3 is detected by the detection module. Therefore, it
is calculated by Det2 − Atk3.
2. KRACK Mitigation Time: It is defined as the time from the moment the mitigation
starts to the moment the mitigation ends. That is, KRACK Mitigation Time = M tg −
Det3. After the duplicated message 3 is successfully detected, the mitigation starts
and the controller will update the flow table to redirect the traffic to the splash portal.
On the splash portal, we use a socket to listen to the traffic and record the time when
we receive the first packet redirected to it.
3. First Message 3 Detection Time: This is the detection time of the first message 3. It
is the time from the moment the authenticator sent the first message 3 to the moment
the first message 3 is detected by the detection module. The first message 3 detection
time is Det1 − Atk2.
4. Overall Experiment Time: This measures the overall time taken to run the experiment,
from the time at which the attack starts to the time at which mitigation ends. It is
calculated as M tg − Atk1.
5. Attack Script Runtime: It is the time from the moment the attack script begins to
the moment the authenticator sends the duplicated message 3. It can be calculated as
Atk3 − Atk1.
6. Detection Script Runtime: This is the time between the first message 3 being detected
and the duplicated message 3 being detected. It measures the runtime of the detection
script. It can be calculated by Det2 − Det1.
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Figure 3.6: Time measurements recorded from 500 KRACK.
Figure 3.6 shows the six time measurements over 500 KRACK. The times are recorded
in milliseconds. From the figure, we can see that the pattern of KRACK detection time, first
message 3 detection time, and overall experiment time are similar. Since KRACK detection
time is the time between duplicated message 3 being sent and detected and the first message
3 detection time is the time between the first message 3 being sent and detected, it is
evident that our detection rate is fairly robust. Figure 3.6 (b) presents the mitigation time
of KRACK, where we can see that the mitigation time is evenly distributed. The mitigation
time includes the time the Floodlight controller responds to update the flow table and the
communication to OVS to navigate the new path to the splash portal. Figure 3.6 (e) and (f)
show the running time of both attack script and detection script over 500 KRACK. During
the attacks, most running times are stable except for some attacks, which tend to have a
longer running time.
Table 3.2 shows the time analysis of these six time measurements. We analyzed the
mean, median, mode, max, min and standard derivation of these time measurements. We
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Table 3.2: Time Measurements (ms)
Time Name
KRACK Detection Time
KRACK Mitigation Time
First Message 3 Detection Time
Overall Experiment Time
Attack Script Runtime
Detection Script Runtime

Mean Median Mode
Max
Min
Std
170.926 163.527 164.819 303.315 12.738 70.410
10.041
10.107
8.351
11.992
8.01
1.176
233.832 227.832 49.839 366.092 49.839 72.805
296.467 268.851 336.879 479.595 132.003 71.930
115.456 112.279 109.22 217.079 108.312 12.085
0.475
0.341
0.318
6.464
0.192 71.930

can see from the table, a successful KRACK requires 115.456 ms on average while the fastest
KRACK detection time is 12.738 ms and the fastest mitigation time is 8.01 ms. A successful
KRACK is when the attack traffic gets through to the client. Our detection of KRACK is to
detect the duplicated message 3, so the detection scheme is happening during the KRACK.
We can see that the standard derivation of the mitigation time is 1.176 ms, which is very
small. It shows that the mitigation time is usually stable in our experiments. The average
time to detect the first message 3 packet is 233.832 ms. Detecting KRACK requires an
average time of 170.926 ms, and we can see that the maximum KRACK detection time is
much higher than the minimum KRACK detection time. There could be a propagation delay
in the transmission due to the environmental constraints. The average KRACK attack is
115.456 ms and the average detection time is 170.926 ms. The difference between them is
57.47 ms, which is very small.
Besides the analysis of the time measurements, we also evaluate False Positive (FP),
True Positive (TP), False Negative (FN), and True Negative (TN). In the experiment, we
launched KRACK 500 times and among them, 459 attacks were successful. For those 41
unsuccessful attacks, we were still able to detect them. The reason is that, the client could
dropped the connection to cause the attack to fail. Since our detection module detects the
duplicated message 3, we were able to detect the attempt of the KRACK, but it will do
no harm to the client. Furthermore, there were 4 successful attacks that we are unable to
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Table 3.3: TP, FP, FN, and TN Distribution
TP: 455
Fact: Attack succeed
Result: Attack detected
FN: 4
Fact: Attack succeed
Result: No attack detected

FP: 41
Fact: Attack failed
Result: Attack detected
TN: 0
Fact: Attack failed
Result: No attack detected

detect. Table 3.3 shows the distribution of FP, TP, FN, and TN, as well as the way we
measure it.

3.4.2 Scalability Analysis
To evaluate the scalability of the proposed framework, we conducted several experiments. As the results demonstrated previously, we achieve an average KRACK detection
time of 170.926 ms and an average mitigation time of 10.041 ms. We use these times to
estimate µ1 and µ2 in order to check how many clients can be handled for detecting and
mitigating KRACK with an acceptable average total time. Since the average KRACK detection time is 170.926 ms and the average KRACK mitigation time is 10.041 ms, we have
µ1 = 351 (authentication) requests per minute and µ2 = 6000 requests per minute.
In the lab experimental setup, we only use one core and assume that we have an
infinite-buffer. This assembles an M/M/1 queue model. Therefore, we first exploit an
M/M/1 queueing model, which can be viewed as a special case of M/M/c/K queue model
with c = 1 and K = ∞. Figure 3.7 (a) presents the average total time of M/M/1 queue
with different arrival rates, λ1 , and the service rates µ1 = 351, µ2 = 6000 according to the
experiments we had. As the arrival rates increase, we can see that there are more clients
connected to the network, the average total time also increases. When λ1 exceeds 325
requests per minute, the average total time increases dramatically. Therefore, with only one
core and the service rate of 351 requests per minute, we can properly handle 325 clients
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Figure 3.7: Scalability model evaluation.
with an average total time less than 5 seconds, which we consider reasonable for a client to
connect to the network.
Based on Figure 3.7 (a), we chose several arrival rates in order to find out the optimal
number of cores we need in the M/M/c/K system. Let K1 = K2 = ∞, which resembles an
M/M/c queueing model. As shown in Figure 3.7 (b), we obtained the average total time
for arrival rates λ1 = 300, 310, 320, and 330 and the number of cores from c1 = c2 = 1 to
c1 = c2 = 4. We can see from the figure that, as the number of cores increases, the average
total time decreases. However, starting from c1 = c2 = 2, the average total times are almost
the same. This demonstrates that two cores are enough.
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Figure 3.7 (c) presents the average total times of the proposed scalability model with
different buffer sizes and arrival rates. In Figure 3.7 (c), we set c1 = c2 = 2. It is easy to
see that as the buffer size increases, the average total time increases. If the buffer size is too
small, most clients will be dropped from the queue. Therefore, as the number of clients in the
queue increases, the average total time will also increase. We can see that when the buffer
size reaches 10 packets (i.e., K1 = K2 = 10), the increase in average total time becomes
steady. Therefore, when we use two cores, we can choose the buffer size to be 10 to achieve
the desired average total time.
Next, we demonstrate how to find the maximum λ1 using Algorithm 1 when other
parameters are known. Let µ1 = 351, µ2 = 6000, c1 = c2 = 2, and K1 = K2 = 10. We
set α = 0.992 based on the detection success rate among 500 experiments. We further have
T0 = 1/µ1 + 0.01. By using Algorithm 1, we can obtain the maximum of λ1 , i.e., λ1 =701.9.
Moreover, we can find the actual average total time of 0.505 seconds. Figure 3.7 (d) shows
the simulation result of the optimization process. As λ1 increases, the average total time
also increases. When λ1 = 700, the average total time is about 0.5 seconds, which matches
our optimization algorithm.

3.4.3 Discussion
We set up an SDN network to evaluate the proposed detection and mitigation framework against KRACK. We recorded and analyzed important time measurements, as shown
in Table 3.2. We also built a scalability model using two M/M/c/K queues to evaluate the
scalability of the proposed framework. By analyzing experiments and simulation results, we
summarized several things that we can address in future work:
1. We found that the proposed model gives false alarms even though some may not affect
the clients. To address this issue, we are going to use machine learning methods. We

67

can extract more information as features to be used in the machine learning algorithms
to detect KRACK rather than just checking duplicated message 3.
2. From the evaluation of the scalability model, we find that as the number of cores increases and the buffer size decreases, the average total time decreases until the number
of cores and the buffer size reaches certain values. With µ1 = 351, we can use two cores
with K1 = K2 = 10 to serve approximately 701 requests per minute with an average
total time of 0.505 seconds. However, the µ1 we used is obtained from a small-scale
SDN network. Furthermore, we simply set c1 = c2 and K1 = K2 in the simulation. In
a real-world scenario, we should be able to handle more clients and c1 , c2 and K1 , K2
can be different. In addition, the average total time (i.e., the average of a sum of the
detection time and the mitigation time) is rather small in the above simulation. This
is because when surfing a website, one usually can tolerate a delay of approximately
3 − 5 seconds. Therefore, in future work, we will explore a large-scale SDN network
and increase the average total time to find out the maximal number of clients the SDN
controller can serve with reasonable arrival rates, the number of cores, and buffer sizes.
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Chapter 4: User Behavior in Phishing Emails

This chapter3 introduces two study designs to understand how users behave when
faced with phishing attacks and the factors that affects user behavior..

4.1

Overview
Attackers usually send out phishing emails, which attempts at online identity theft,

to deceive victims into providing their personal information and login credentials [1]. They
are prevalent today since current growing Internet techniques heavily involve the sensitive
information of users. Therefore, more and more personal computers and mobile device users
are exposed to phishing attacks. Many researchers have studied phishing attack problems
where many solutions have been proposed to detect phishing attacks at different levels [7, 25,
72]. However, only a few studies focus on the user behavior effect or why users are vulnerable
to phishing. To better educate users and help them be aware of phishing, it is important to
understand users’ behaviors when they face phishing.
Users are vulnerable to phishing attacks at varying levels due to the non-homogeneity
of users’ backgrounds, such as their network security background [49]. Even though usability and security experts emphasize that user behavior is not the dominant factor that a
secure computer system could rely on, researchers have discovered that user behavior plays
an important role in phishing attacks [27]. Therefore, educating users to be aware of phishing attacks has become a useful security prevention strategy. There are several education
3

Part of this chapter was published in EAI Endorsed Transactions on Security and Safety (2019) [57].
Permission to reproduce in the dissertation is included in Appendix A.
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methods to prevent phishing, such as educational games and the providing of more security
information [10, 46].
In this chapter, we aim at studying user behavior factors, such as intervention, phishing types and monetary incentives, to understand how a user behaves during phishing email
attacks and what mechanism may prevent a user from being a victim of such attacks. Our
understanding of user behaviors will help us design a guideline to educate users on how to
identify phishing emails, thus reducing the chance to be a victim, although a user education
study is out of the scope of this study. Here, intervention is defined as a mechanism that
helps users be aware of the phishing attacks more easily by modifying phishing types to make
them appear more obvious [111]. A monetary incentive is introduced to motivate users to
pay attention to phishing attacks [16].
Specifically, in our experiments, we recruit participants to conduct email sorting tasks.
The emails used in the chapter consist of both phishing emails and non-phishing or normal
emails. There are three kinds of phishing types in the phishing emails: (1) Suspicious
sender’s email address; (2) Suspicious links or attachments; (3) Malicious email contents.
The performance of each participant, such as sorting correctness, sorting time, and mouse
movement, is recorded in each experiment.
The goal of this chapter is first to understand how user behaviors are correlated to
phishing victims through an analysis of the collected experimental data and then to develop
a model to predict how likely a user will be a victim based on the user’s profile and behavior.
For this purpose, we strive to answer the following challenging questions in this chapter:
1. How can intervention affect user behaviors?
2. Which phishing types are more harmful than others?
3. How can a monetary incentive affect a user’s behavior and sorting?
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4. How accurately can we predict the performance of a user on email sorting based on
user profiles and behaviors?
We propose two study designs, an on-site study design and an online study design,
to answer the above questions. We start with an on-site study design that is carried out
in a contained lab environment. In the lab, participants are asked to conduct a pre-setup
experiment on our testbed, where each participant first reads a number of emails and then
sorts them as either “phishing” or “non-phishing.” The overall performance score is defined
as the number of emails correctly sorted by a participant. If an email is sorted correctly,
the participant will get 1 point for that email. If it is sorted incorrectly, the participant will
get 0 point for that email. The overall performance score for the participant is the points
accumulated after sorting all emails.
In this chapter, our first main challenge is how to answer the above questions quantitatively. To address it, we first quantify user information and behaviors and then analyze the
data obtained from participants’ performance as well as participants’ basic information from
the surveys. The two surveys are designed for on-site and online, respectively, so they are not
identical as their experimental environments are different. We also design a mouse tracking
mechanism to trace their mouse movement. Particularly, this first challenge becomes very
difficult to address in the on-site study. The reason is that the number of experimental data
is typically small in the on-site study. The small dataset constraint is due to the limitation of budget, resources, and participant diversity, resulting in a limited number of people
who could be recruited. Actually, such limitations are very typical in many human subject
studies. In this chapter, only 40 participants were recruited for the on-site study. Thus, our
second main challenge to answer the above questions is how to extract useful information
from a relatively small number of collected data to build a machine learning framework for
predicting the overall performance score of each participant accurately.
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Furthermore, to increase the diversity and scalability of recruitment, we designed an
online study using Amazon Mechanical Turk, where participants attend the study online. In
the online study, we also collect the profile, performance and mouse movement of each participant, similar to the on-site study. Based on the collected data, we develop a comprehensive
approach to build a machine learning framework for predicting participants’ susceptibility
to phishing. To better evaluate the performance of participants, we divide their overall performance scores into two classes, ‘Good’ and ‘Poor,’ based on a critical point. The critical
point is defined as a criterion threshold to divide the participants into these two classes. If
a participant’s overall performance score is greater than or equal to critical point c, his/her
performance will be considered as ‘Good,’ otherwise, his/her performance will be considered as ‘Poor.’ We evaluated the critical point in the online study to find the best division
method. Our machine learning models are developed by using the 10-fold cross-validation
with an idea of the feature cross-selection approach [35].
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
1. We propose two study designs, on-site and online, to understand how a user behaves
when phishing attacks occur and determine how to help a user identify phishing attacks or prevent a user from being a victim of phishing attacks. The on-site study is
conducted in a lab environment, while the online study is carried out online only. The
on-site study is easily controlled as it is done in a contained environment, but recruiting a large number of participants becomes difficult. Conversely, the online study is
easily scaled up, but the recruitment of online participants makes it difficult to ensure
the data and profile of participants fit the desired parameters.
2. To help users, we introduce intervention, which is a mechanism used in our study to
help participants be aware of their weakness areas related to phishing. We specifically
address the type of phishing attacks that they are unaware of and help them recognize
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that type of phishing attack. Furthermore, we introduce a monetary incentive to test
how the incentive impacts participants’ security decision making. To test the effective
of monetary incentive, we divide the participants into two groups, a control group and
an incentive group.
3. Besides participants’ basic background information, we developed software tools to
collect experimental data, including time measurement, mouse movement, and their
answers to the survey questions that we carefully designed for the above two study
designs. The collected experimental data in our two study designs help us answer all
the questions raised beforehand.
4. To understand the collected data, we proposed and develope a machine learning framework to predict the overall performance score of each participant based on his/her
profile. The proposed machine learning framework consists of four different models;
They are developed with a 10-fold cross-validation and feature cross-selection. We
also performed attribute reduction by analyzing the data obtained from participants’
performance and the participants’ basic information from the survey to select the best
attributes for our machine learning framework.
5. To better evaluate the performance of participants, we introduced two classes of performance, ‘Good’ and ‘Poor,’ based on a critical point, which functions as a division
criterion. In this chapter, we find the best critical point to divide the participants’
over all performance scores into the two classes by using collected experimental data
through the proposed machine learning model.

4.2

Study Design
In modern times, email has been widely used throughout the world via the Internet.

Many people, especially employees in a work environment and students at colleges, read and
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respond to emails daily. Email has become an integral part of daily life for most people.
Thus, it is very likely that many people might have experienced wrongly clicking on a request
link that was seemingly legitimate, but actually was a phishing link.
In order to thoroughly understand user behaviors when phishing attacks occur and
provide better user education, we present two study designs, on-site and online. The onsite study design has experiments carried out in a lab environment while the online study
was carried out online. We collaborated the user behavior studies with the research team
from Johns Hopkins University [4]. The on-site study is designed to answer the first three
questions given in Section 4.1, and the online experiment is designed to answer the last
question in that section. It is important to set up our study to correspond to user behaviors
when users read emails in the real-world. Checking emails in our daily life can be viewed as
an email sorting task because when we look at an email, we will first decide whether it is a
legitimate email. If it looks suspicious, we will not open it. Even if we open it, we will look
at some keywords and decide whether or not the email is trustworthy and useful. In both
study designs, we mimic an email opening, reading, and decision atmosphere for participants
who are asked to act as an administrative assistant to help the department chair, Dr. Jane
Smith, to sort her emails while she is on vacation. Therefore, we set up an email testbed
to allow users to sort a lot of emails for Dr. Jane Smith’s email accounts. Those emails
consist of both the legitimate and phishing variety. Participants do not need to respond to
any of the emails, only sort them into either a “phishing” or “non-phishing” folder based on
the information within the email and email interface. In our study, we use emails obtained
from the real world with some necessary modifications for personal information protection.
Phishing emails were derived from the “Phish Bowl” database [2]. Legitimate emails were
derived from legitimate emails received by the research team. In this section, we will give a
detailed description of these two study designs.
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4.2.1 On-Site Study Design
In the on-site study design, the email sorting task consists of three rounds and each
round has a unique set of emails. Across the three rounds, there are a total of 60 unique
emails of which 45 are phishing emails with 15 in each of the three phishing types and 15
are legitimate emails. In the second round, the intervention is introduced to the participants
based on their performance in the first round. We recruited 40 participants to perform this
task. During the experiment, the participants are asked to differentiate the phishing emails
from legitimate emails. After the tasks in three rounds, participants are required to take a
survey in the lab, where they are asked their backgrounds and their feelings about the task.

4.2.1.1

Environmental Setup for On-site Study
Our email testbed has three main components: RoundCube email client, Postfix

virtual mail server, and BurpSuite proxy listener. The RoundCube email client is a browserbased IMAP client. It is used as an interface for users to preview and sort emails in our study.
The Postfix mail server provides the ability to host multiple virtual domains. The emails
preloaded in the the RoundCube client are sent through the Postfix virtual mail server.
We utilized the HTTP Proxy feature of BurpSuite, which serves as a middleman
between the browser and the destination web servers. This allows the interception, inspection
and modification of the raw traffic passing in both directions. Therefore, both the HTTP
request and response sent between RoundCube client and Postfix mail server can be captured
by BurpSuite. The logs obtained from BurpSuite after each round are saved as an XML
format. We then parse the XML file to extract useful information for later analysis.
The email testbed is set up in the environment of Ubuntu 16.04 Long Term Support
(LTS). The testbed architecture is shown in Figure 4.1. It consists of RoundCube Email
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Figure 4.1: Email testbed architecture.
client, BurpSuite Proxy Listener, and Postfix Virtual Mail Server, where there are HTTP
requests and responses among them.
In addition, we developed Python code to track a mouse’s movement, including the
mouse’s locations and staying durations at those locations. In our study, the developed
Python code captures the time and location of the mouse during the experiment. If a participant’s mouse stays in the same location for an extended period of time, we will calculate
and record the time interval t (in seconds). We then set up a threshold a to determine the
hesitation times h. If t > a, we will increase h by 1. This helps us to estimate how hesitation
will affect the performance.

4.2.1.2

Participant Recruitment for On-site Study
In this research, the IRB approval number is Pro00026240, which allows us to recruit

people to conduct experiments. We recruited students as well as faculty on campus through
announcements via mailing lists and flyers distributed all over the campus. Before they
began the experiment, we ask them to sign the Informed Consent Form. As a result, 40
participants have been recruited by our research team to conduct this on-site study. The
participants are from different educational backgrounds, including undergraduate, graduate,
and faculty. Moreover, we chose participants from different majors. This will help us reach
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Table 4.1: Basic Information Distribution of Participants in On-site Study
Gender

Male
Female

Age

55%
45%

18∼ 20
20∼30
30∼38

25%
67.5%
7.5%

Education

Undergraduate
Graduate

65%
10%

Ph.D.
Faculty

20%
5%

demographic diversity in this on-site study. Table 4.1 shows the participants’ distribution.
In general, the participants’ ages range from 18 years old to 38 years old with the average
age being 23 years old. There were 22 male participants and 18 female participants.
We introduce a monetary incentive in our study. It is designed to answer the third
question in section 4.1. We want to study whether the monetary incentive will affect a
user’s performance or not. In our other research for educational purposes, we can decide if
we will use this monetary incentive factor to motivate the users to pay more attention to
phishing attacks. Each participant has a chance to receive a $10 to $25 payment. To see
how a monetary incentive can affect the performance, we assign them into two groups: a
control group and a monetary incentive group. Each participant in the control group will
get a $15 payment regardless of his/her performance. The base amount for the incentive
group is $10, but participants will have a chance to earn $5 extra from each round if they
get an accuracy above 80%. For each participant, the accuracy is the percentage of his/her
overall performance score divided by the max overall performance score. The max overall
performance score is 60 for on-site study.

4.2.1.3

Phishing Types
In our study, we explore three different kinds of phishing attacks. The goal is to

investigate which kinds of phishing attacks more easily deceive the clients into sorting the
phishing emails as “non-phishing” than the other two phishing types.
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1. A suspicious sender’s email address: The sender’s email address is usually faked in
this type of phishing attack. An attacker can easily fool the users through this type
of phishing. This is because the users usually only pay little attention to the sender’s
email address nowadays. Every day, the users receive many emails, and they usually
only focus on the content of the email without checking the sender’s email address.
Even though some users look at the email address, they may not identify it as a
phishing email because some phishing email addresses are created to resemble real
email addresses. For instance, “paypal@on1ine.service.org” is a fake address that does
not exist. However, at first glimpse, it seems legitimate.
2. Suspicious links or attachments: This type of phishing attack contains suspicious links
or malicious attachments. An attacker can create the phishing links by manipulating
similar letters, misspelling words, or creating non-existent fake links that redirect the
users to a phishing website. The attacker can attach malicious attachments in an email
in the form of an exe file, a pdf file, or other file types. After the users download those
files, malware may be installed on the users’ computers.
3. Malicious Email Contents: This type of phishing attack contains suspicious email
contents, like fake icons, that are usually more difficult for users to notice. If the users
do not look very carefully, it will seem that the email is a normal email. However,
there are some clues one can find to identify malicious content, such as spelling errors,
grammar issues, or even fake icons. Some of the malicious contents are very difficult to
spot, especially for the users that are not native English speakers, since they are less
likely to notice the grammar or spelling errors.
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4.2.1.4

Experimental Rounds
In the on-site study, we let participants perform three rounds of email sorting tasks.

We collected data for each participant from each round. The average time spent in each
round is about 15 minutes. After each round, the participant can take a few minutes to rest
while we save the data captured from the experiments.
1. First Round: This round contains 20 emails in total. Among them, 15 are phishing
emails and 5 are legitimate emails. Those 15 phishing emails consist of three types
of phishing attacks we introduced above. Each type of phishing attack has 5 emails.
The task for participants is to classify 20 emails into two folders, suspicious or nonsuspicious, based on their knowledge and experience. Participants were not told how
many phishing emails and legitimate emails were given.
2. Second Round: The second round has the same procedure as the first round, except
that we introduce the intervention in this round. The intervention is to make the
phishing emails more obvious to participants so that they will pay more attention to
this certain type of phishing attack. This could be a useful factor to help prevent users
from being a victim of the phishing attack by educating them about the different types
of phishing attacks. After a participant finishes the first round, we calculate the score
of the first round for the participant. The score is calculated based on the correctness
of sorting each email. If a participant moves the email to the correct folder, he/she
will get 1 point; otherwise, 0 points are granted. The performance score will then
be calculated. The performance score for each round is ranging from 0 to 20. The
overall performance score is ranging from 0 to 60, which is the sum of the performance
score for each of the three rounds. We separated the performance score in the first
round for different phishing types and checked for the lowest score among the three
phishing types. Therefore, the phishing type with the lowest score was used as an
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intervention in the second round. Before the second round started, we pointed out the
type of phishing attacks with the lowest score to the participant. We made this type
of phishing attack easier for participants to spot in the second round. For example, if
type 1 phishing, suspicious sender’s email address, has the lowest score, then we will
tell the participant to pay more attention to the sender’s email address. The reason for
introducing intervention is that we want to examine whether a participant will perform
better in this round with the knowledge of a certain type of phishing attack. We also
want to see whether the intervention action will affect the overall performance of each
participant or not.
3. Third Round: This is the last round of our experiment. In this round, a participant will
again sort 20 emails. The procedure of the third round is the same as the previous two
rounds. However, we will not give any intervention in this round. We will compare
the performance score between round three and the other two rounds to see if the
intervention from the last round will still affect the third round.

4.2.1.5

Survey for On-site Study
After the participants finish the three-round experiment, immediately we ask them

to fill out an online survey in the lab. We record their answers for later analysis. The survey
not only contains participants’ background information, such as gender, age, and educational
background, but also contains their habits and experience of using social media. In addition,
the survey contains the questions about the experiment the participants just took. There
are 30 questions in total. The following shows some survey questions and statements used
in this research:
1. Are you currently, or have you previously been enrolled in computer science/engineering
or cybersecurity-related degree program?
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2. I was not generally suspicious of the emails.
3. I generally noticed nothing unfamiliar about the emails.
4. I feel confident in my ability to determine which emails are legitimate.
Here, participants are given multiple choices, “Yes/No” for the above first question and
“Strongly Disagree/Disagree/Neutral/Agree/Strongly Agree” for the three statements, where
the participants are required to choose one of the answers in multiple choice format.
Besides the data we collected throughout the experiment, this survey can better
help us understand participants, behaviors and background regarding phishing attacks. A
complete list of survey questions for on-site study is shown in Appendix C.

4.2.2 Online Study Design
Although by performing the on-site study, we can sufficiently answer the first three
questions mentioned in section 4.1, it is not sufficient for us to thoroughly understand user
behaviors regarding phishing attacks. This is due to the limitation of demographic diversity
and the number of participants recruited. Therefore, we created an online study design
developed by our project teams. The online study can sufficiently help us answer the question
of what kind of groups are more vulnerable to phishing attacks and how accurately we can
predict the performance based on user behavior. Since the online study design is an extension
of the on-site study design, we will only introduce the new components of the online study
design and compare both designs afterward.

4.2.2.1

Environmental Setup for Online Study
Since the online study is carried out online, we need to capture the data remotely.

Instead of using the BurpSuite Proxy Listener, we utilize the JavaScript-based Data Capture
that is installed in the users’ browsers to record users’ input and utilize the AJAX-based
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Table 4.2: Basic Information Distribution of Participants in Online Study
Gender

Male
Female

Age

61%
39%

20∼ 35
36∼50
51∼61

65.6%
26.7%
7.7%

Highest Education

High School
College

13.3%
77.8%

Master
Doctorate

6.7%
2.2%

Data Sender that is also installed in the users’ browsers to transmit the collected data to
the server. We also use the Logger, which is installed on the server, to log the data. A
confidence rating module was installed in the RoundCube email client to allow a participant
to rate his/her confidence level after sorting each email. The confidence level measures how
confident the participant is in sorting an email correctly. It is a 10-point scaled rating, 1
meaning low confidence and 10 meaning high confidence.

4.2.2.2

Participant Recruitment for Online Study
We used Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) [3] to recruit the participants to conduct

our online study. As a result, we successfully recruited 90 participants. Table 4.2 shows the
participants’ basic information distribution. The average age of the participants is about
34 years old, while the participants’ ages range from 20 to 61. Among 90 participants, 35
are female and 55 are male. 8 participants are currently students. There is one participant
who is not an English native speaker. Nine participants previously completed a network
engineering or cybersecurity course/certificate.
Monetary incentive is a helpful feature for user behavior studies, so we will also
include it in the online study with a slightly different amount. For the control group, the
base amount is $4 and if the participants’ performance in the incentive group has an accuracy
greater than 75% , they will get a chance to win up to $8. For each participant, the accuracy
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is the percentage of his/her overall performance score divided by the max overall performance
score. The max overall performance score is 40 for online study.

4.2.2.3

Experimental Round and Phishing Types
In the online study, we only set up one experimental round and the same phishing

types in the on-site study will be used. The data collected from the on-site study are adequate
for answering the first three questions so that we will simplify the online study into just one
round. There are 40 unique emails, including 20 legitimate emails and 20 phishing emails,
that the participants need to sort. The emails used in the online study are different from
on-site study. The participants do not know how many emails are phishing and how many
are normal. When sorting each email, the participants are asked to rate their confidence
level. The email sorting tasks need to be finished within 30 minutes by the participants.

4.2.2.4

Survey for Online Study
Because the study is carried out online, we designed two types of surveys, a pre-survey

and a post-survey. We use the pre-survey to investigate participants’ basic information and
backgrounds, such as age, gender, educational background, cybersecurity background, and
habits of using social media. When we carry out the on-site study, we include the Informed
Consent Form and email sorting instructions whose information is similar to the pre-survey
questions in the online study. The post-survey asks questions related to the email sorting
task they took. The pre-survey and post-survey questions contain the questions from the
on-site study survey, and we added more questions because the online study is designed
differently from the on-site study. For example, we add the confidence rating in the online
study. In the post-survey from the online study, we have a question: “How confident are you
in your assessment of the number of correctly sorted emails?” is not in the on-site survey.
The complete survey questions for online study is shown in Appendix D.
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4.2.3 Similarity and Comparison
Since the online study is designed based on the on-site study, these two study designs
are similar to a certain extent but have differences because they focus on different aspects
of user behavior study.

4.2.3.1

Similarity
Both studies contain email sorting tasks and aim to study user behaviors when users

are encountered with phishing attacks. Both of them divide participants into two groups, a
monetary incentive group and a control group. In these two studies, the phishing types are
the same. Both conduct surveys about the email sorting task afterward.

4.2.3.2

Comparison
First, the on-site study is carried out in a lab environment. Participants are asked to

show up and perform the experiment on the testbed setup in the lab, while the online study
is carried out totally online, including recruiting participants and the email sorting task, and
so on. Second, participants recruited online are more diverse than the on-site study and the
number of participants recruited for the online study is far greater than the one in the on-site
study. Third, for the on-site study, we design the intervention mechanism and three-round
email sorting task sorting 60 emails in total. Our collected data are sufficient for analyzing
the intervention question, so, for simplicity, we only design a one-round email sorting task
for sorting 40 emails in the online study. Fourth, in the online study, we add the rating
module to allow users to rate their confidence level for each email, which turns out to be
a useful feature in our machine learning framework. Fifth, for the survey questions in the
on-site study, we only ask participants to do them after the experiment and do not have a
pre-survey. However, in the online study, we have both a pre-survey and post-survey due to
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the online experiment format. There are more survey questions in the online study than in
the on-site study.

4.3

Data Analysis Methodologies
The goal of this chapter is to understand the behavior of a user encountering phishing

attacks thoroughly and to identify which factor plays a significant role in phishing attack
outcomes. We raised the four questions in Section 4.1. In order to answer these questions
effectively, we propose two data analysis methodologies. Especially, to answer the first three
questions, we propose a statistical method to analyze each factor, such as intervention,
phishing types, and incentive. To answer the fourth question, we propose machine learning
techniques. In this section, we first discuss our dataset and attributes and then propose a
machine learning framework.

4.3.1 Data Set and Attributes
We developed a data collection infrastructure such that it automatically captured
and monitored the detailed actions of each participant like clicks, navigation, timestamps,
and decisions. We further processed and stored this information in a csv file format for
analysis. Since we proposed two study designs, the on-site dataset and online dataset,
they are separately stored and analyzed by different data analysis methods. The on-site
study design mainly focuses on the factors that will affect user behaviors with phishing
attacks, while the online study is designed to predict user performance, ‘Good’ or ‘Poor,’
with phishing attacks. Although we also predicted the user performance by analyzing the
on-site dataset based on machine learning approaches, our experimental results show that it
is not as good as we expected and we suspect it is because of the small dataset size. Thus,
we design the online study whose collected data are efficient to predict the user performance,
as shown later. For this reason, we apply statistical models to analyze the on-site dataset in
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order to understand the contributing factors of user behaviors when phishing attacks occur.
We will also briefly show our user performance prediction results using the on-site dataset
and compare them based on the online dataset.
The on-site data file stores data collected from 40 participants, including the participants’ detailed information, time used to sort emails (processing time), and performance
score. There are 50 attributes in total for the on-site dataset. They are used for answering
the first three questions from Section 4.1. Similar to the on-site data file, the online data
file stores data collected from 90 participants but contains additional information, including
confidence rating and new survey questions, but it does not include intervention information.
There are 119 attributes in total in the online dataset, including the features extracted from
the survey questions and the email sorting task. They are used to answer the last question
from Section 4.1. Among them are the processing time and performance score to evaluate
the performance of a user. Besides these parts, many attributes come from the pre and post
surveys that provide basic information such as gender, age, education level, and questions
about the task. An example of the attributes can be seen in Table 4.3. In the study column,
‘On-site’ or ‘Online’ means that the attribute is only for the on-site study or the online study,
respectively. ‘Both’ means that the attribute is for both studies. The online study has more
attributes from the survey questions than the on-site one. A complete list of attributes with
their descriptions is given in Appendix E.
The performance score is one of the most important indicators in both of our studies.
For the on-site dataset, we calculate the performance score, ranging from 0 to 20, for each
participant in each round and the score of each phishing type in each round, ranging from 0 to
5. We can use a statistical method to analyze what factors, such as intervention, processing
time, and incentives, are closely related to the performance score. For the online dataset, we
calculate the overall performance score of each participant and the score of phishing emails
and normal emails. We can feed the online dataset into machine learning models to predict
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Table 4.3: Example of Attributes Used in Each Study
Attribute Name
Performance Score
Rx P1 Score
Rx P1 Time
Rx Nr Score
Rx Nr Time
Rx Phish Score
Rx Phis Time
Avg Rating
Sort Correct
Sort Confidence
num sorted
Phish Score
Phish Time
Native Spk
Edux

Description
Overall performances for the participants
Performance for the phishing type 1 emails in each round
Time used for sorting the phishing type 1 emails in each round
Performance for 5 legitimate emails in each round
Time that used to sort 5 legitimate emails in each round
Performance for sorting all 15 phishing emails in each round
Time that used to sort all 15 phishing emails in each round
The average confidence rating of all emails
How many emails the participant thought they sorted correctly
How confident the participant feels after the task
How many emails have been sorted in the task
Performance for sorting all phishing emails
Time that used to sort all phishing emails
Whether the participant is native English speaker
Educational background for the participants

Study
Both
On-site
On-site
On-site
On-site
On-site
On-site
Online
Online
Online
Online
Both
Both
Both
Both

the performance of the participant, which is the accuracy in identifying phishing emails, for
understanding the behavior of a user encountering phishing attacks.

4.3.2 Proposed Machine Learning Framework
The goal of using a machine learning method is to predict a user’s performance
when the user encounters phishing attacks, whether or not the user can do well or poorly.
Hence, we divided the participants’ overall performance scores from online study into two
different classes, ‘Good’ and ‘Poor,’ where a critical point, c, is used as the threshold of
determining ‘Good’ or ‘Poor.’ If the participant’s overall performance score is greater than
or equal to c, then we label the performance of the participant as ‘Good,’ otherwise, the
performance of the participant is labeled as ‘Poor.’ This means that we have to deal with
the classification problem. Some attributes are more significant than others, where some of
those other attributes have minimal or no significant effects. Therefore, choosing attributes is
critical in our machine learning framework, especially with a small dataset but a large number
of attributes in the on-site study. Moreover, correlation studies are conducted to illustrate the
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relationship of these attributes with the overall performance scores of participants [71, 80].
We consider each participant as an instance. Since we have 119 attributes but only 90
instances, solving the classification problem becomes challenging. While the sample size of
our dataset is relatively small, the number of attributes is relatively big. To resolve this
problem, we introduce a stepwise attribute selection to reduce the number of attributes and
propose our machine learning models in detail. Then, we present how to find the best critical
point to classify user performance where a prediction accuracy is ensured.

4.3.2.1

Stepwise Attribute Selection
To select the best attributes for the following machine learning models, we first per-

form a Pearson-correlation coefficient analysis to observe the importance of every single
attribute that correlated to the overall performance score [13]. Based on the data we collected, we then fit our data into a linear regression model to evaluate all the attributes. In
order to select the most significant attributes to build the model, we use forward stepwise
selection to select the attributes. It allows features to enter the regression model one at a
time and produces a subset of features. The model entry significance level is based on a
p-value threshold. In our experiment, we choose p = 0.25. There were 16 attributes selected
for online study.

4.3.2.2

Machine Learning Models
After we get the reduced attributes, we now apply machine learning approaches to

predicting the overall performance. We built 4 different machine learning models, Decision
Tree-J48, Naive Bayes (NB), Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Multilayer Perceptron
(MP). We utilize an idea of cross-selection for the attributes. Suppose we have m attributes
and each time we randomly select n attributes to feed into our cross-validation machine
m
e. To get every attribute
learning model. This process will be run k times, where k = d m−n
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Figure 4.2: The proposed machine learning framework.
selected with a chance of 99.6%, we require k ≥ 4, that is, n ≥ 75% · m. We chose m = 16,
n = 12, so k = 4 in our study. We use the method of 10 fold cross-validation to precisely
predict the performance of each participant.
The procedure of the proposed machine learning framework is shown in Figure 4.2.
We have m attributes in total after stepwise attribute selection. Then, we randomly choose
n attributes to do the cross-validation training by applying our machine learning model. The
next step is to calculate the performance accuracy. This process can be run k times. These
k performance accuracies are averaged to form one final accuracy.

4.3.2.3

Determination of A Critical Point
To predict the performance of a user encountering phishing attacks, we divide the

performance into two classes, ‘Good’ and ‘Poor,’ based on a critical point, as discussed
before. Let us recall that the critical point c is used to divide the participants’ performance.
Finding a critical point is a critical step before using our machine learning models to make
the prediction. To find the best critical point, we use a greedy method to go through all
critical points and check whether it can achieve the preferred accuracy. In the evaluation
section, we will show how to find the critical point in detail.
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Table 4.4: Email Round Score and Time

4.4

Score & Time (Mean)

Round1

Round2

Round3

R2-R1

R3-R2

Phish Score
Total Score
Phish Time(s)
Total Time(s)

10.18
14.2
437.58
630.88

11.6
15.23
413.45
600.4

10.02
14.25
433.25
568.35

1.42
1.025
-24.13
-30.48

-0.15
0.05
19.8
-32.05

Evaluation
In this section, we analyze and identify what factors may significantly impact a phish-

ing attack outcome. Motivated by the questions introduced in Section 4.1, we will first evaluate the intervention factor and find the types of phishing attacks that are more effective
to deceive people. We want to see if there is a difference in time spent for sorting phishing
emails and time spent for sorting normal emails. We will also study if a monetary incentive
can improve the participants’ performance regardless of their backgrounds. Last but not
least, the evaluation of our machine learning models will be presented. The evaluation of
the intervention, phishing types, and a monetary incentive uses the dataset from the on-site
study, while the evaluation of performance prediction accuracy uses the dataset from the
online study. We will also present the performance prediction results when using the on-site
dataset and compare it with the results by using the online dataset.

4.4.1 Intervention Evaluation
The phishing score (Phish Score) is the number of correctly sorted phishing emails.
For example, if a phishing email is correctly sorted, the participant will get 1 point for
that phishing email, otherwise the participant will get 0 point for that phishing email. In
each round, the Phish Score is ranging from 0 to 15 and the Total Score is ranging from
0 to 20. The mean Phish Score is the average of phishing scores for all participants. The
mean Total Score is the average of total scores for all participants. To answer the first
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Table 4.5: Different Types of Phishing Score and Time
Phishing Type

Mean Score

Mean time(s)

Intervention Frequency

Type 1
Type 2
Type 3

9.5
11.35
10.95

447.425
431.875
404.975

17
8
15

question, which asks how intervention can affect the phishing attack, we calculate the mean
Phish Score, mean Total Score, mean total processing time (Total Time) and mean phishing
processing time (Phish Time), as shown in Table 4.4. The result is shown in Table 4.4.
The intervention is introduced in the second round and based on the performance of the
participant from the first round. The max Phish Score for each round is 15 and the max
Total Score for each round is 20. As shown in Table 4.4, the second round has been slightly
improved compared with the first round. The mean time used in the second round is also
less than the first round. However, in the third round, the performance score has decreased
and is even worse compared to the first round.

4.4.2 Phishing Type Evaluation
We analyze the phishing score and time for different types of phishing attacks. The
question of what kind of phishing attacks are more effective to deceive people can be answered
in Table 4.5. Type 1 phishing attack contains a suspicious sender’s email address, type 2
phishing attack has suspicious links or attachments, and type 3 phishing attack contains
malicious contents. The mean score (max score is 15) and mean time are calculated by taking
the average of all 40 participants’ scores and time for different phishing types over three
rounds. The intervention frequency describes the total times of a certain type of phishing
intervention is introduced in the task. The max intervention frequency is 40, which is the
sum of intervention frequencies for all three phishing types, since we have 40 participants and
each participant will be given an intervention only once. In each round, there are 5 phishing
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Table 4.6: Monetary Incentive Analysis
Condition

Phish Score

Total Score

Phish Time

Total time

(mean)
30.1
33.5

(mean)
42.65
44.7

(mean)
1148.95
1419.6

(mean)
1580.5
2018.75

Control
Incentive

emails for each phishing type and we have three rounds, so the score for each phishing type
is range from 0 to 15. From the table, we can see that type 1 phishing has the lowest score
and has been used the most as an intervention. This implies that type 1 phishing is more
effective compared to the other two types. In addition, it is not hard to see that the score
is inversely proportional to intervention frequency. Thus, intervention is a suitable attribute
that can be used in our neural network.

4.4.3 Monetary Incentive
The next question is whether a monetary incentive affects overall performance score
and total processing time. We calculate the mean overall performance score, mean phishing
score, mean total processing time, and mean phishing processing time of all 40 participants
over all three rounds. The max Phish Score is 45 and the max Total Score is 60. The result
is shown in Table 4.6. Control means that there is no monetary incentive. That is, it is the
control group, and Incentive represents that this group will get a monetary incentive. From
the table, we can see that the group with incentive has a higher overall performance score
than the group who does not. Furthermore, the incentive group tends to spend more time
than the control group. Therefore, the incentive is also a useful attribute with regards to a
phishing outcome.
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4.4.4 Mouse Movement Evaluation
In our study, we also record the mouse movement from each participant and calculate
the hesitation times, where we pick the threshold h = 10. We analyze the relationship
between hesitation and the total time used in this study, as well as the relationship between
hesitation and total score. The relationship between hesitation and total time and the
relationship between hesitation and overall performance score are shown in Figure 4.3.
From Figure 4.3 (a), we can see that as hesitation times increase, the total time is also
increasing. The orange line represents the incentive group, while the blue line is represents
the control group. It is clear from this figure that the incentive group tends to spend more
time and has more hesitation times. This is because the participants in the incentive group
are more cautious when doing this task.
Figure 4.3 (b) shows the relationship between overall performance score and hesitation times. For the control group, the relationship between overall performance score and
hesitation time is not obvious. For the incentive group, the overall performance score is
decreasing as the hesitation times increase. It is interesting to see that if the participants
become over-cautious, they tend to perform worse.

4.4.5 Time Difference Between Phishing Email and Control Email
Next, we want to study whether users spend different amounts of time sorting normal
or phishing emails. Since there are three rounds in total, we compare the time of each round
and the total time of all three rounds. As shown in Figure 4.4, in round one, users spend less
time in sorting phishing emails. In round two, users also spend less time sorting phishing
emails. However, in round three, users spend more time in sorting phishing emails. Thus,
in total, there is no significant time difference between sorting normal and phishing emails.
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Figure 4.3: Hesitation evaluation. (a) Relationship between hesitation and total time.
(b) relationship between hesitation and overall performance score.

4.4.6 Attribute Reduction
The first important step is to select the useful attributes that will be used in our
machine learning models. We perform Pearson-correlation coefficient analysis to observe the
importance of every single attribute that correlated to the overall performance score. From
our observation, we could see that most of the attributes are not significantly related to the
overall performance score. Detailed information on part of the most significant attributes to
least significant attributes is shown in Table 4.7.
In the table, the information is sorted from most to least significant. We can see
the attribute phishing accuracy has p < 0.0001.

Some attributes are significant, such

as sort agreement 4 and sort correct 1, and are from the survey questions. In particular,
sort agreement 4 is referred to as the question in the post-survey: “I felt irritated and
stressed while sorting emails.” In this analysis, we select top 16 attributes that will be used
in our machine learning models.
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Figure 4.4: Time comparison for normal email and phishing email.

4.4.7 Critical Point Evaluation
Before we apply the machine learning model to predict whether a participant will
perform well or not, we need to find a critical point to label each participant’s performance
as ‘Good’ or ‘Poor.’ We test the critical points for each machine learning model. We take
the labels for the 90 online participants and use 16 attributes obtained from stepwise feature
selection to do a 10-fold cross-validation to predict them as a ‘Good’ or ‘Poor’ sorter to get
the value in the table. The results are shown in Table 4.8. As we can see in the table, c is
the critical point ranges starts from 15 to 38; this is because the lowest overall performance
score is 14 and the highest overall performance score is 39 in our online dataset. So, we can
label any participant with an overall performance score (number of correctly sorted emails)
greater than or equal to that listed in the table for c as ‘Good’ and those with less than c
as ‘Poor.’ Both accuracy and time are presented for each machine learning model, where
the time is in seconds. From the table, we observe that when the critical point is 15, 16, 17,

95

Table 4.7: Stepwise Feature Selection
Attributes Name Pearson-correlation Coefficient
p
phishing accuracy
0.71771
<.0001
pay
0.56868
<.0001
num sorted
0.53976
<.0001
sort agreement 4
-0.46401
<.0001
sort correct 1
0.41037
<.0001
avg rating
0.30178
0.0038
strat cues2 5
-0.26026
0.0132
sort confident 1
0.25666
0.0146
sort agreement 1
-0.25249
0.0164
BFI BFI 41
-0.24255
0.0213
BFI BFI 30
0.19971
0.0591
incentive
0.19248
0.0691
beliefs agreement 2
0.16783
0.1139
highest education
0.15475
0.1453
cyber experience
0.13459
0.2059
reg sm scale
-0.12917
0.2250
strat cues3 6
-0.11807
0.2677
gender
-0.11538
0.2788
strat cues3 3
0.09484
0.3739
beliefs agreement 5
-0.09279
0.3844
BFI BFI 9
-0.08385
0.4320

18, 19, or 20, the four models have the highest accuracy. However, the distribution of the
number of ‘Good’ and the number of ‘Poor’ is uneven. We need to choose a critical point
that can divide the number of samples in ‘Good’ class and the number of samples in ‘Poor’
class more reasonably to achieve better accuracy. Therefore, the best critical point for J48
is c = 32 with an accuracy of 97.78%, and for Naive Bayes is 88.89% accuracy with c = 31;
for SVM and Multilayer Perceptron, it is also when c = 30, where the accuracies are 92.22%
and 96.67%, respectively.

4.4.8 Performance Prediction Evaluation
In our machine learning framework, we use four different machine learning models,
J48, Naive Bayes, SVM, and Multilayer Perceptron, to predict the performance. We have
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Table 4.8: Critical Point
c
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Good Poor
89
89
89
89
89
89
88
88
87
86
85
80
78
70
63
53
47
40
37
27
16
11
8
3

1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
3
4
5
10
12
20
27
37
43
50
53
63
74
79
82
87

J48
NB
SVM
MP
Accuracy Time(s) Accuracy Time(s) Accuracy Time(s) Accuracy Time(s)
98.89% 2.889 98.89% 0.024 98.89% 0.063 98.89% 2.889
98.89%
2.76
98.89% 0.011 98.89% 0.045 98.89%
2.76
98.89% 2.745 98.89%
0.01
98.89% 0.023 98.89% 2.745
98.89%
2.74
98.89% 0.007 98.89% 0.055 98.89%
2.74
98.89% 2.754 98.89%
0.01
98.89% 0.018 98.89% 2.754
98.89% 2.717 98.89% 0.006 98.89% 0.019 98.89% 2.717
95.56% 2.731 97.78% 0.007 98.89% 0.016 97.78% 2.731
95.56%
2.73
97.78% 0.006 98.89% 0.049 97.78%
2.73
94.44% 2.721 97.78% 0.007 97.78% 0.047 96.67% 2.721
92.22%
2.75
97.78% 0.008 96.67% 0.015 95.56%
2.75
91.11% 2.728 96.67% 0.007 96.67% 0.017 94.44% 2.728
85.56% 2.743 86.67% 0.004 90.00% 0.027 92.22% 2.743
90.00% 2.748 84.44% 0.004 88.89% 0.022 88.89% 2.748
87.78% 2.732 85.56% 0.003 87.78% 0.019 87.78% 2.732
88.89% 2.788 83.33% 0.004 91.11% 0.032 93.33% 2.788
86.67% 2.835 88.89% 0.004 92.22% 0.069 96.67% 2.835
96.67% 2.781 88.89% 0.005 91.11% 0.067 93.33% 2.781
97.78% 2.833 82.22% 0.007 91.11% 0.071 94.44% 2.833
97.78%
2.86
81.11% 0.004 88.89% 0.031 91.11%
2.86
85.56% 2.851 82.22% 0.004 86.67% 0.019 93.33% 2.851
94.44% 2.809 84.44% 0.004 86.67% 0.013 90.00% 2.809
96.67% 2.835 84.44% 0.003 87.78% 0.015 88.89% 2.835
96.67% 2.802 92.22% 0.003 91.11% 0.014 91.11% 2.802
93.33% 2.802 96.67% 0.003 96.67% 0.022 96.67% 2.802

presented a table of critical points in the above section; to further observe the preferred
critical point, let us look at Figure 4.5 (a). It shows the accuracies of different machine
learning models choosing different critical points for the online data. The critical points
started from 26 because for the critical points smaller than 26, the division of two classes is
unevenly distributed. We can see from this figure, when the critical point is 30, except for
J48, the other three models have the highest accuracy compared with choosing other critical
points. Therefore, we chose the critical point c = 30 to label the dataset into two classes of
human sorters of emails, ‘Good’ and ‘Poor.’ In the rest of the evaluation, we use the critical
point c = 30 for the online data.
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Figure 4.5: Evaluation of critical points and 10-fold cross-validation. (a) Accuracy of
each machine learning model with different critical points. (b) Evaluation of 10-fold
cross-validation accuracy of each fold for different machine learning models with the critical
point c = 30.
Next, we use four machine learning models with 10 fold cross-validation to do the
classification using the online dataset. Figure 4.5 (b) shows the accuracy of each fold when
using four different machine learning models. The final accuracy result is the average of
all 10 folds. For each fold, fold NO.1 to 10, the accuracy changes because each fold uses
different training and testing subdatasets as we discussed in the last section. For J48, the
accuracy ranges from 55.56% to 100%; only fold 5 and fold 9 achieve an accuracy of 100%
and fold 10 has the worst accuracy, 55.56%. The accuracies are ranging from 77.78% to
100% for both Naive Bayes and SVM. For Multilayer Perceptron, the accuracy ranges from
88.89% to 100%, giving it the best performance among all machine learning models. The
Mean Squared Error (MSE) of each fold for 4 ML models is shown in Figure 4.6 (a). We
evaluate with the same 12 attributes per fold.
Next, we evaluate the accuracy of feature cross-selection. The accuracy of randomly
selected attributes is shown in Figure 4.6 (b). In this research, we select n = 12, which means
in each step, we have 12 attributes used in the ML models. The process is performed four
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Figure 4.6: Evaluation of MSE and attributes selection. (a) Evaluation of 10-fold
cross-validation Mean Squared Error (MSE) of each fold for different machine learning
models. (b) Accuracy of 12 random selected attributes repeated 4 times with different
seeds.
times. Each time, 12 different attributes are randomly selected, which are not selected per
fold, and the performance accuracy is calculated after performing 10-fold cross-validation.
Hence, these are optimistic results. Then we take the average of the four performance
accuracies as our final accuracy. As shown in Figure 4.6 (b), the final accuracy for J48 is
86.67%, for Naive Bayes is 88.89%, for SVM is 92.22%, and for Multilayer Perceptron is
96.67%.
Then, we evaluate the final accuracy, which is the average accuracy of all four performance accuracies. Each instance is a participant and we evaluate the relationship between
the number of instances and accuracy. Figure 4.7 (a) shows the accuracy increases as the
number of instances increases. We can see that the average accuracy is 93.84% when using
Multilayer Perceptron and the accuracy reaches 96.67% when using all 90 instances. For
SVM, which has the second-best performance, the average accuracy is 89.93% and when
using 90 instances, it has reached its highest accuracy, that being 92.22%. For Naive Bayes,
the average accuracy is 86.23% and for J48, the average accuracy is 83.58%.
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Figure 4.7: Evaluation of accuracies and false positive. (a) Accuracy of each machine
learning model with different number of instances. (b) Evaluation of false positive rate for
different machine learning models.
Figure 4.7 (b) shows the false positive rate for all four models. Recall that there are
53 instances in the ‘Good’ class and 37 in the ‘Poor’ class. We also compute false positive
rates because it is also an important measurement that we want to keep it as low as possible.
Multilayer Perceptron has the lowest false positive rate at an instance number of 90, which is
0.0314. J48 has the highest false positive rate, which is 0.2953 when the number of instances
is 40. The online data was stratified to get 40 instances, including 23 ‘Good’ and 17 ‘Poor.’
The false positive rate is evaluated on the ‘Poor’ class. As the number of instances increases,
the trend of false positive rate in percentage for all four machine learning models decreases.
The average raw false positive rates for J48, Naive Bayes, SVM and Multilayer Perceptron
are 0.1707, 0.1472, 0.0976 and 0.0588, respectively. Among them, J48 has the highest false
positive rate and Multilayer Perceptron has the lowest false positive rate.
Aside from just comparing the accuracy, we also use other metrics to compare the
classifiers, such as false positive rate, F-Measure, MCC and area under ROC. The comparison
result is shown in Table 4.9. The False Positive (FP) rate and True Positives (TP) rate are
common measures in machine learning; with the TP rate, higher is better, while with the
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Table 4.9: Evaluation of Machine Learning Models
Evaluation Method

J48

Naive Bayes

SVM

MP

Accuracy
FP Rate
TP Rate
Precision
Recall
F-Measure
MCC
AUC
MSE
Time(s)

86.67
0.1257
0.8667
0.8717
0.8667
0.8675
0.732
0.936
0.1085
0.089

88.89
0.1428
0.8889
0.8936
0.8889
0.887
0.7725
0.9444
0.0762
0.08

92.22
0.0951
0.9222
0.9232
0.9222
0.9216
0.8394
0.9136
0.0778
0.208

96.67
0.0314
0.9667
0.967
0.9667
0.9667
0.9317
0.998
0.0201
4.552

FP rate, lower is better. In our experiment, they are applied to the ‘Poor’ class, which has a
smaller number of samples. Precision is defined as the number of TP over the number of TP
plus the number of FP. Recall is defined as the number of TP over the number of TP plus
the number of False Negatives (FN). The F-Measure is a measure of a test’s accuracy and is
defined as the weighted harmonic mean of the precision and recall of the test. The Matthews
correlation coefficient (MCC) is used in machine learning to measure the quality of binary
(two-class) classifications; values closer to 1 are better and 1 represents a perfect prediction.
The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is created by plotting the true positive
rate against the false positive rate at various threshold settings. In this experiment, we
calculate the area under the ROC curve. We can see that Multilayer Perceptron has the
highest value of MCC, area under ROC curve, and F-Measure. This demonstrates that
Multilayer Perceptron has the best performance among all four classifiers.
We also used the on-site dataset to do user performance prediction; we followed the
same procedure as we discussed above. For the on-site dataset, we choose 16 attributes
and the critical point c = 43. There are 23 participants’ overall performance scores are
labeled as ‘Good’ and 17 are labeled as ‘Poor.’ In the on-site dataset, we only have 40
participants, which means we can only use 40 instances. We use WEKA application to

101

Figure 4.8: Comparison of on-site study and online study. (a) Accuracy comparison of
four machine learning models using on-site dataset with 40 instances and online dataset
with 90 instances. (b) Accuracy comparison of four machine learning models using on-site
dataset with 40 instances and online dataset reduced to 40 instances.
perform classification using J48, Naive Bayes, SVM, and Multilayer Perception with the
default parameters. Figure 4.8 (a) shows the accuracy comparison of four machine learning
models using the on-site dataset and online dataset. The on-site dataset contains 40 instances
and the online dataset contains 90 instances. We can see that the accuracy of the online
study is much better than the on-site study. For J48, the on-site study accuracy is 65% and
the accuracy of the online study is 86.67%. With Naive Bayes, we have an accuracy of 70%
in the on-site study and 88.89% in the online study. The accuracy by using SVM for the
on-site study and the online study is 70% and 92.22%, respectively. Multilayer Perceptron
has the highest accuracy in both the on-site study and the online study. The accuracy is
80% in the on-site study and 96.67% in the online study.
Figure 4.8 (b) shows the accuracy comparison of four machine learning models using
the on-site dataset and online dataset with 40 instances. For online study, we randomly chose
40 instances from 90 instances. We can see the online study has much better accuracy than
the on-site study. For J48, the on-site study accuracy is 65% and the accuracy of the online
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study is 72.5%. With Naive Bayes, we have an accuracy of 70% in the on-site study and
82.5% in the online study. The accuracy by using SVM for the on-site study and the online
study is 70% and 85%, respectively. Multilayer Perceptron has the highest accuracy in both
the on-site study and online study. The accuracy is 80% in the on-site study and 90% in the
online study. With the same number of instances, the online study still has better prediction
performance. The reason is that the attributes in our online study are more numerous and
apparently have more discrimination power than the attributes used in the on-site study.

4.5

Discussion
In this chapter, we have collected data from both an on-site study and online study. In

the on-site study, we applied statistical methods to analyze the data. The on-site study aims
to answer questions regarding intervention, phishing types, and monetary incentive factors.
We have first analyzed the data collected from the on-site study through statistical methods,
where we introduced an intervention in the second round. Our analysis demonstrates that
the participants with an intervention and a monetary incentive perform better than those
in other cases. Our data analysis also showed the performance of participants in the second
round had been improved due to the use of the intervention. However, we noticed that in the
third round, some participants’ performance was even worse compared with that of the first
round. We suspect that the worse performance could be thanks to the participants’ fatigue
in the third round. To address this phenomenon, we plan to conduct further experiments
in our future research. Because of the limitation of budget and resources, we were only able
to recruit 40 participants in the on-site study. To increase the scalability and diversity of
participants, we designed the online study and collected data from more participants using
Amazon Mechanical Turk. We applied four machine learning models, J48, Naive Bayes,
SVM and Multilayer Perceptron, to predict a participant’s performance into two groups,
‘Good’ or ‘Poor’, from a set of descriptive attributes. Our data analysis results showed that

103

Multilayer Perceptron performed the best, with an accuracy of 96.67%. However, there was
a weakness. That is, in this study, we did an attribute selection or reduction through fitting
all attributes in a linear regression that might cause the problem of multicollinearity because
some of the attributes were somewhat correlated. This is due to the small dataset in both
our studies, resulting in a limitation to the current research.
In our future work, we will consider recruiting more participants through some participant recruitment platform. In the online study, we initially had about 110 participants
but only 90 of them could be used and other participants did not finish the task. To ensure
the quality of the data collected from the participants and avoid random guessing, we need
be very careful with the way we design the experiment. For the on-site study, it is easier to
monitor the participants while they are performing the task. However, it is hard for online
study. In our future research, to address the random guess issue, we can require the participants to open their cameras and record them during the task. Later, we can examine those
recorded videos to check if they randomly sorted the emails. In our experiment, we recorded
the time it took each participant to sort each email. In our future work, we will examine
the relationship between the time and random guessing. If the time used by the participant
is very short, then it can be suspicious. We also designed a mouse tracking mechanism to
trace their mouse movement and determine their hesitation times. In our future work, we
will examine the relationship between the hesitation times and random guessing. Based on
their hesitation times, we will check if the participants just keep clicking on the emails to
sort or spend time to think about it when sorting each email.
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Chapter 5: Adversarial Attack Defending System for Securing In-Vehicle
Networks

This chapter proposes an LSTM-based detection model to detect a False Data Injection Attack and an Adversarial Attack Defending System to defend against adversarial
attacks.

5.1

Overview
A modern vehicle such as a connected and autonomous vehicle (CAV) contains a

significant number of Electronics Control Units (ECUs) that communicate with each other
based on a standard communication protocol, such as Controller Area Network (CAN), in
a vehicle network. With the development of CAVs, more and more ECUs are added in
a vehicle for advancing driving functionalities, such as lane changing, parking assistance,
and emergency braking [66]. All these features may require a vehicle to communicate with
itself, other vehicles, and infrastructures, such as Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-toInfrastructure (V2I) communication [96].
Securing in-vehicle networks is as important as ensuring the security of Vehicle-toEverything (V2X) communication. Researchers have shown that ECUs in an in-vehicle
network are vulnerable to remote attacks [11, 38]. An attacker can easily access an invehicle network to compromise ECUs through a WLAN or Bluetooth since ECUs are all
connected and vice versa. Thus, in-vehicle networks are vulnerable to various attacks, such
as intrusion attacks and false data injection attacks (FDIA) [20]. Deep learning methods
have been widely used to detect attacks in in-vehicle networks [42, 43]. However, recent
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studies have shown that deep learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples [86].
Adversaries can manipulate input data and force a trained model to produce mis-classified
outputs. The adversarial attack makes a deep learning-based detection model useless. Hence,
it is crucial to build a deep learning model that is robust against adversarial attacks.
SDN provides flexibility and programmability to the SDN controller to better manage
a network, such as monitoring and forwarding traffic flows. For in-vehicle network, it is
crucial to detect and defend against attacks. Otherwise, a disastrous outcome can happen,
such as traffic crashes [39]. With the benefit of an SDN network, it is easier to detect and
mitigate the attack traffic.
Current studies are mostly focused on developing and defending adversarial attacks
in image datasets, such as crafting adversarial examples based on the MNIST dataset and
attacking traffic signs in a CAV system [22]. In this chapter, we explore three adversarial
attacks: FGSM, BIM, and DeepFool attacks on time series datasets, which contain time series
of in-vehicle network signals. These adversarial attacks were briefly discussed in Chapter 1
and will be discussed in detail in Section 5.2. To show the limitation of the machine learning
based detection model, we first adopt the method used in [43]. That is, we first craft false data
injection attacks based on the normal signals and then we build an LSTM-based detection
model to detect false data injection attacks with a success rate of over 98%. Then, we show
that FGSM and BIM attacks can easily bypass this high performance LSTM-based detection
model around 99% of the time. We propose an Adversarial Attack Defending System (AADS)
for in-vehicle networks as a countermeasure against these adversarial attacks. We use AADS
to build a robust LSTM-based detection model to effectively detect both false data injection
attacks and three types of adversarial attacks. To be precise, we first build a Long Short
Term Memory (LSTM)-based detection model to detect FDIA. Then, we use FGSM and
BIM to attack the LSTM-based detection model. Finally, we propose a defending scheme
to counter FGSM and BIM attacks and ensure the robustness of the detection model. The

106

SDN controller will monitor traffic flows within an in-vehicle network. The detection module
and the adversarial defending module are deployed inside the SDN controller because the
SDN controller has a global view of the whole network. The adversarial defending module
will provide a countermeasure to FGSM and BIM to ensure the robustness of the detection
model. Once the attack traffic is detected, the SDN controller will update forwarding rules
in its flow table to mitigate new incoming attack traffic.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
1. To demonstrate the limitation of the LSTM-based detection model, we implement three
adversarial attacks for attacking the LSTM-based detection model. Inspired by Khan
et al. [43], we implement an false data injection attack to attack the CAN bus and build
an LSTM-based detection model to detect it. Our experimental results demonstrate
that adversaries can easily attack the LSTM-based detection model with a success rate
of over 98%.
2. To overcome these adversarial attacks, we propose AADS to detect and mitigate adversarial attacks. AADS is an SDN-based system developed by utilizing the global view
of an SDN controller. Thus, within AADS, we can easily monitor any incoming traffic
in an in-vehicle network. The close monitoring can help us better detect and mitigate attack traffic more efficiently. The proposed AADS can efficiently detect FDIA
and defend against FGSM, BIM, and DeepFool attacks on the LSTM-based detection
model.
3. We develop an SDN-based in-vehicle network to better assist attack detection and
mitigation on GENI [61]. The real-world virtual testbed makes our experimental evaluation more realistic than the one obtained typically through simulators or a campus
network in one or multiple collaborative laboratories.
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5.2

Attack Model
Deep learning methods have been widely applied to a variety of domains, including

image classification, Natural Language Processing (NLP), speech recognition, CAVs, and
malware detection. Ensuring the security of deep learning methods used in those domains
has become a crucial task, especially in the area of security-critical environments, such as
CAVs. Szegedy et al. [86] first found that adversarial attacks can compromise neural network
models. That is, attackers can create adversarial examples to limit the use of neural networks.
Similarly, attackers can create adversarial examples to cause a vehicle to take unexpected
actions, which results in disastrous consequences. In this section, we first briefly present the
FDIA model adopted from [43] to attack ECUs. Then, we introduce three adversarial attack
methods to attack the LSTM-based detection model.

5.2.1 False Data Injection Attack (FDIA)
An adversarial attacker has various ways to modify the original data. One easy way
to modify the original data is to add some uniform random noise to it. We first observe the
normal range for each signal. Then, we generate a random value that follows the uniform
distribution within the interval of the normal range. The equation of the FDIA model is
shown as follows:
0

X i = X i + δi ,

(5.1)

where δi ∼ U(−Xi , Ximax − Xi ) is a uniform random value added to the normal data to
create the adversarial data, Ximax is the maximum value of a signal, i denotes the signal
0

number, and Xi is the adversarial data of ith signal modified by the attacker. For example,
0

X6 is the adversarial data of the 6th signal modified by the attacker. Detailed descriptions
of the dataset can be found in [43].
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5.2.2 Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
In this chapter, we assume that an attacker has complete knowledge of a neural
network model. The attacker can access the architecture of the neural network model and
all parameters from the model. This is considered a white-box attack.
First, let us give out some notation. Let F (X) be the neural network model that
takes the input X ∈ Rn for some integer n and yields the output y. Given a valid input
0

X, attackers will try to generate a similar input X such that the adversarial output does
0

0

not match the original output, F (X ) 6= F (X), and ||X − X || < η for some specified small
number η ∈ R. Note that the || ∗ || is an application specific metric for measuring the
0

similarity between X and X . In this chapter, the specific metric we use is the L2 metric,
0

which is a standard Euclidean distance between X and X .
There are two types of adversarial attacks: targeted and untargeted adversarial at0

tacks. Targeted adversarial attacks search for an adversarial input X such that it will be
0

classified as the specified class t. That is, F (X ) = t, t 6= y. On the contrary, untargeted
0

0

adversarial attacks only search for an adversarial input X so that F (X ) 6= y.
An attacker can attack the deep learning based detection model using the fast gradient
sign method [33]. The deep learning model is obtained through gradient descent optimization
to minimize the cost function J(X, ylabel ), i.e., reduce the error between the true label ylabel
and the predicted labels ypred . On the contrary, an attacker may want to increase the error,
and a simple but effective way to do it is by increasing the error by gradient ascent of the
cost function ∇X J(X, ylabel ). That is, an attacker can simply add noise in the direction of
0

gradient ascent for the cost function sign(∇X J(X, ylabel )). Hence, X can be calculated using
FGSM as follows:
0

X = X +  × sign(∇X J(X, ylabel )),

(5.2)
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where  is included to control the magnitude of the noise. In order to keep the adversarial
examples X 0 similar to X, we usually try to choose a value of  such that it is as small as
possible.

5.2.3 Basic Iterative Method (BIM)
BIM is an iterative version of FGSM proposed by Kurakin [51]. BIM generates the
adversarial examples iteratively using a smaller step α. First, we set up the initial:
0

X0 = X,

(5.3)

Xi+1 = ClipX, {Xi + α × sign(∇X J(X, ylabel ))},

(5.4)

0

and then Xi+1 is calculated as follows:
0

0

where α is the step size and ClipX, {∗} is the element-wise clipping of X to make the clipped
value belong to the range of [Xi,j − , Xi,j + ]. This ensures that the generated adversarial
examples are in the original range of the input X so that they cannot be easily detected by
a simple outlier detector.

5.2.4 DeepFool
DeepFool is proposed to create the minimal perturbations that can fool neural networks into misclassifying the input [65]. In this chapter, we only consider binary classification
problems since we classify the signal to be either attack or normal. DeepFool utilizes the
assumption that the robustness of the model for an input Xi is equal to the distance of Xi
0

from the hyper-plane that separates two classes. First, we set up the initial, X0 = X and
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we calculate the minimal perturbation, pi , as follows:

pi = −

F (Xi )
∇F (Xi , ylabel )
||∇F (Xi , ylabel )||22

(5.5)

and then we add the perturbation to the inputs:
0

0

Xi+1 = Xi + pi

(5.6)

The above process will continue until the label of the adversarial example and the true label
are not the same.
To craft adversarial data using FDIA, we observe the normal range for each signal
from the DBC file for KIA Soul, which is a vehicle type from which the dataset was collected
from, and generate a random value that follows the uniform distribution within the interval
of the normal range. For the sample with a duration of 10 seconds, we randomly choose
1 second to attack. Figure 5.1(b) shows an example of an FDIA attack on the normal
signal in Figure 5.1(a). An LSTM-based detection model proposed in [43] can easily detect
this attack model with a success rate of nearly 100%. However, such a type of deep learning
based detection model itself is vulnerable to adversarial attacks. For instance, we can modify
the attack signal in Figure 5.1(b) slightly with the fast gradient sign method described in
subsection B. As shown in Figure 5.1(c), there is still an attack at 393-394 seconds and its
signal is quite similar to one shown in Figure 5.1(b). Intuitively, we can assume that if
the LSTM-based detection model can correctly identify the attack signal in (b), it can also
to detect the attack signal in (c). However, the LSTM-based detection model is unable to
detect it; i.e., it classifies the signal in (b) as ”Attack” but misclassifies the signal in (c). as
”Normal.” Similarly, in the case of BIM, Figure 5.1(d), the LSTM-based detection model
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Figure 5.1: Attack on TQI ACOR signal. (a) Normal signal that is correctly classified as
”Normal” by the LSTM-based detection model; (b) FDIA attack signal that is correctly
classified as ”Attack” by the LSTM-based detection model; (c) FDIA attack signal being
misclassified as ”Normal” after applying FGSM to it even though signal in (c) is similar to
signal in (b). (d) FDIA attack signal being misclassified as ”Normal” after applying BIM
to it. (e) FDIA attack signal being misclassified as ”Normal” after applying DeepFool to it.
fails to recognize that the signal in (d) is the attack signal. In Figure 5.1(e), the LSTM-based
detection model also fails to recognize that the signal in (e) is the attack signal.

5.3

Adversarial Attack Defending System
CAN is a standard bus communication protocol that has been widely used for in-

vehicle network communication. It uses a broadcasting method to transmit messages from
one ECU to other ECUs on the bus. The source and destination information are not included
in the transmitted messages. Thus, it is vulnerable to attacks due to a lack of authentication.
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Figure 5.2: Format of a CAN data frame.
An attacker can easily modify the CAN bus data, which can result in vehicle malfunctions.
In this section, we first describe the dataset and data processing method used in this chapter.
Then, we perform a correlation analysis for applying FDIA. Next, we present the architecture
of the SDN-based in-vehicle network. Then, we introduce our AADS and discuss each
component in detail.

5.3.1 Data Processing
In order to examine the efficacy of proposed AADS, the dataset from a real in-vehicle
CAN bus is used in this chapter. It was collected from the KIA SOUL by Hacking and
Countermeasure Research Lab [53]. The dataset contains four parts: DoS attack data, fuzzy
attack data, impersonation attack, and attack free state data. In this chapter, we only use
attack free state data since we will modify the data using our FDIA model.
For an in-vehicle network, messages are exchanged between ECUs via CAN data
frames. As shown in Figure 5.2, a CAN data frame consists of several fields: the arbitration
field, the control field, and the data field. In the attack free state dataset, there are three
fields of information logged from the vehicle, including ID, Data Length Code (DLC), and
data itself in addition to timestamps. The dataset contains approximately 1904 seconds of
data and 3,713,146 rows of CAN data frames. To better understand and process the dataset,
the raw CAN data frames need to be decoded. We use a generic KIA DBC file decoder from
OpenDBC repository to decode the dataset [63]. OpenDBC is created by CommaAI with
a repository of DBC files for different models of vehicles. The DBC file is usually used to
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Table 5.1: Information for Decoding Raw CAN Data
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Signal
SAS Angle
SAS Speed
MsgCount
CheckSum
TQ COR STAT
TQI ACOR
N
TQI
TQFR
VS
MUL CODE
TEMP ENG
BRAKE ACT
TPS
PV AV CAN
VB
TQI MIN
TQI
TQI TARGET
TQI MAX

MSG
SAS11
SAS11
SAS11
SAS11
EMS11
EMS11
EMS11
EMS11
EMS11
EMS11
EMS12
EMS12
EMS12
EMS12
EMS12
EMS14
EMS16
EMS16
EMS16
EMS16

CID
02b0
02b0
02b0
02b0
0316
0316
0316
0316
0316
0316
0329
0329
0329
0329
0329
0545
0260
0260
0260
0260

MID
688
688
688
688
790
790
790
790
790
790
809
809
809
809
809
1349
608
608
608
608

Bits
0-15
16-23
32-35
36-39
4-5
8-15
16-31
32-39
40-47
48-55
6-7
8-15
32-33
40-47
48-55
24-31
0-7
8-15
16-23
40-47

Scale
0.10
4.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.39
0.25
0.39
0.39
1.00
1.00
0.75
1.00
0.47
0.39
0.10
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.39

Offset
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-48.00
0.00
-15.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

describe the data over a CAN bus. It has the information to decode CAN data frames. For
instance, we can use the scale and offset values in the DBC file to convert raw bits of data
into signal values. In the raw dataset, the CAN IDs (CID) are in the hexadecimal format,
whereas the Message IDs (MID) are decimal in the DBC file. Therefore, we first need to
convert the CIDs in the raw dataset to match the MIDs in the DBC file for decoding.
Each CAN ID has a specific ECU associated with it, and each ECU has multiple
signals. Each signal has its own decoding information like scale and offset. For comparison
purposes, we explore 20 signals associated with five ECUs that are the same as Khan [43].
These ECUs are Motor Driven Power Steering (MDPS), Engine Management System (EMS),
Anti-lock Braking System (ABS), Electronic Parking Brake System (EPB), and Electronic
Stability Control System (ESC). MDPS and EMS ECUs send CAN messages/frames to ABS,
EPB, and ESE. EMS broadcasts four types of CAN messages (MSG), including EMS11,

114

EMS12, EMS14, and EMS16, whereas MDPS ECU broadcasts SAS11 CAN messages. Table
5.1 shows all the information needed for decoding the raw CAN data frames, which are
converted into signal Values. The formula used to decode raw data is shown as follows:

Vsignal = o + s × Vraw

(5.7)

where Vsignal is the signal value after decoding. o is the offset and s is the scale value from
the DBC file. Vraw is the raw decimal data value from the data field. First, the 8 bytes of
data are converted to 64 bits. Then, we find the corresponding bits to calculate the raw
decimal data value for each signal according to Table 5.1.
Since we only investigate brake-related ECUs, we first need to filter out all unrelated
data. After filtering, we have 952,101 rows of CAN data frames. The number of CAN data
frames for each CAN ID is evenly distributed. We use the 20 signals presented in Table 5.1
as our features to create the dataset for training and testing. The reduced dataset related
to the five ECUs associated with the braking system contains 1904 seconds of data.
Then, the dataset is divided based on the timestamps. We choose samples that are 10
seconds long. For example, the first sample lasts from the 1st second to the 10th second; the
second sample lasts from the 2nd second to the 11th second. Thus, we create 1894 samples
in total. Among these samples, half of them are randomly selected to craft adversarial data.
Before we start to apply FDIA, we need to figure out what features are related to
each other. If the value of one feature has been modified, it will also affect the features that
have a high correlation to it. Therefore, we first perform correlation analysis among all 20
features. We used Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient to determine if two features are linearly
correlated. To decide if two features are correlated, we set the significance value to be 0.75.
For example, TQI ACOR is related to features TQI, TPS, PV AV CAN, TQI MIN, and
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TQI TARGET with correlations of 0.999537, 0.887654, 0.862707, 0.778768, and 0.934837,
respectively.
Based on the analysis of correlation among all features, the signals/features we chose
to attack are TQI ACOR, N, TQFR, and VB. Since these signals are also related to other
features, we finally choose 11 signals for crafting adversarial data. These signals are from
EMS11, EMS12, EMS14, and EMS16 message frames and are related to braking and the
Engine Management System.

5.3.2 SDN-based In-vehicle Networks
Inside an in-vehicle network, many ECUs are communicating through the CAN bus
by broadcasting and receiving messages. Securing communication between ECUs is crucial
for ensuring the security and safety of a vehicle. In an SDN network, the control plane
is separated from the data plane to provide more flexibility and programmability for the
network. This feature allows an SDN controller to monitor and manage the traffic flows going
through a network in real-time. By applying SDN architecture in an in-vehicle network, we
can better manage the network and improve the security and safety of a vehicle.
In this chapter, we propose an SDN-based adversarial attack defending system to
detect and mitigate adversarial attacks. We create a malicious ECU that is connected to the
CAN bus. Figure 5.3 shows the architecture of the proposed SDN-based in-vehicle network.
There are six ECUs connected to the CAN bus, and among them, there is a malicious
ECU. EMS and MDPS ECUs can only broadcast CAN messages, whereas ABS, ESC, and
EPB ECUs can only receive CAN messages. The malicious ECU can both broadcast and
receive CAN messages. The OpenFlow Switch (OVS) is deployed on the CAN bus, and it
is connected to the SDN controller so that the SDN controller can manage the traffic going
through the CAN bus through OVS. Figure 5.3 shows that the solid orange arrows denote
the normal traffic flows, whereas the dotted red arrows represent attack traffic flows. The
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Figure 5.3: SDN-based in-vehicle network.
EMS ECU will send out attack free EMS11, EMS12, EMS14, and EMS16 CAN messages,
whereas the MDPS ECU will send out attack free SAS11 CAN messages through the CAN
bus. The malicious ECU will eavesdrop on all messages exchanged on the CAN bus and
modify some of the messages by applying FDIA. Then, the adversarial messages will be
broadcast on the CAN bus, and some ECUs, such as ABS, ESC, and EPB, will receive those
adversarial messages and react based on them.

5.3.3 AADS Architecture
The AADS is deployed in the SDN controller because it has a global view of the
network and can manage the traffic flows easily. In the AADS, there are four main phases:
a) the SDN controller will consistently monitor the traffic flows going through the CAN bus;
b) an LSTM-based detection model will detect FDIA; c) the defense method will secure the
LSTM model against adversarial attacks; d) the mitigation module will mitigate the attack
traffic to the backend storage. To be precise, the SDN controller will update the entries of
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a flow table that resides in OVS to change the forwarding rules in the network. Thus, the
attack messages will no longer be broadcast, and instead, they will be sent to the backend
storage.

5.3.3.1

LSTM-based Detection Model
In the AADS, we build an LSTM-based detection model to detect FDIA. LSTM is

suitable for handling a time-series dataset for prediction and classification. In our study,
after decoding all raw data into signal value data, each sample contains 20 features and each
feature is a time-series sequence. Therefore, we build an LSTM model to classify the FDIA
from normal messages. Figure 5.4 shows the architecture of the LSTM detection model. We
use 20 signals as input features, and each input feature is a sequence of decoded CAN signal
values. In our model, the LSTM layer contains 128 neurons. LSTM is suitable for processing
a time series dataset. An output layer with only one neuron follows the LSTM layer. This is
because we are dealing with a binary classification problem, whose output is either 1 (Attack)
or 0 (Normal). The activation function we use for this layer is sigmoid. The cost function
we used was binary cross-entropy. The optimization function we chose is Adam [45], which
is an adaptive learning rate optimization algorithm. It computes individual learning rates
for different parameters.
In our dataset, we have 1894 instances in total. Among these instances, we use 80%
of the dataset for training, 10% for validation, and 10% for testing. To be precise, we have
1516 samples for training, 189 samples for validation, and 189 samples for testing. In each
sample, it contains 20 features and each feature is a sequence with a length of 1002. The max
length of a feature sequence is 1002 and any feature sequence whose actual length is less than
1002 is padded with zeros at the end. The shape of the input data is [num sample, max len,
num feature], where num sample is the number of samples used in training. max len is the
maximum length of all feature sequences and all other sequences whose length is less than
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Figure 5.4: Architecture of LSTM-based detection model.
maximum length are padded with zeros at the end. num feature is the number of features.
In this dataset, the num sample is 1516, the max len is 1002, and num feature is 20.

5.3.3.2

Adversarial Attacks Defending Scheme
Adversarial attacks can compromise the trained machine learning model to produce

incorrect classification results. A scenario like CAVs can cause a deadly outcome if the system
fails to perform correctly. In this chapter, we explore three adversarial attacks, FGSM, BIM,
and DeepFool. First, we generate adversarial examples using FGSM, BIM, and DeepFool on
the test dataset to see the efficiency of compromising the trained LSTM model. Then, we
propose an adversarial re-training method to make the LSTM model more robust against
FGSM, BIM, and DeepFool attacks.
To build a robust LSTM detection model, we iteratively re-train the LSTM model
using both the adversarial examples and the original training samples. Let S denote original
0

samples, S denote samples altered by adversarial attacks on S, let N denote the batch size,
and let i be the i-th iteration of re-training. Algorithm 2 shows the method of our adversarial
attack defending scheme. For iteration i, the detailed steps of iterative re-training are 1)
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Algorithm 2: Adversarial Defending Algorithms
Result: Robust LSTM Model Mf
while Training dataset is not empty do
Randomly choose N instances Si from the training dataset;
0
Use adversarial model to generate N adversarial samples Si ;
0
Add Si to adversarial repository S repo ;
Randomly choose N adversarial samples Siadv ;
Train on Si + Siadv , Validate on validation set V
end
0

randomly choose N instances Si from the training data; 2) create N adversarial examples Si
0

using the adversarial model; 3) add N adversarial examples Si to adversarial repository S repo ;
4) randomly choose N adversarial samples Siadv from the repository S repo ; 5) combine the
selected N adversarial examples Siadv and the N original instances Si , so we have 2N samples
for training. After re-training, we validate on validation dataset V and check whether the
stopping criteria is met. If it is met, we stop the re-training process. Otherwise, the process
repeats until reaches the maximum number of iterations that is given by a user. Each
iteration produces a new LSTM model Mi . When the process stops, we save the final LSTM
model Mf , and we evaluate Mf using the test dataset to determine the robustness of Mf .
5.3.3.3

Mitigation Scheme
In an SDN network, the SDN controller can manage the traffic by updating the rules

in the flow table in the OVS. Based on the OpenFlow Protocol, the communication between
the SDN controller and the OVS can be established through a secure channel. In a flow
table, each entry consists of three important fields: a) a header field that defines the flow;
b) an action field that redirects the path of a traffic flow; and c) a statistic field that stores
the network information of a flow.
In this chapter, we utilize the characteristic of the above features in an SDN network
to update the forwarding rules in the flow table. This can prevent the adversarial messages
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Figure 5.5: Example of FDIA on TQI ACOR signal.
crafted by attackers from being broadcast on the CAN bus. Instead, the adversarial messages will be redirected to the backend storage. Once the LSTM-based detection model has
detected the attack traffic flows, it will proceed to the mitigation stage. In this stage, we
add a flow rule in the flow table to change the path of the attack traffic flows. They will be
forwarded to the backend storage instead of broadcasting on the CAN bus. Meanwhile, we
will send an alert to drivers about the attack. If there is no attack detected, the messages
will be broadcast normally.

5.4

Evaluation
To conduct the experiment, we first set up the SDN-based in-vehicle network on

GENI [61], which is a nationwide suite of infrastructure supporting “at scale” research in
networking, distributed systems, security, and novel applications. We used Floodlight as
our SDN controller [62]. The SDN-based in-vehicle network consists of six ECUs, including
EMS, MDPS, ESC, EPB, ABS, and a malicious ECU. EMS, MDPS, and the malicious
ECU will broadcast CAN messages. Only EMS and MDPS broadcast authentic messages
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and malicious ECU broadcasts adversarial messages. ESC, EPB, and ABS will only receive
messages. In this section, we first evaluate our LSTM-based detection model, including
the evaluation of FDIA. Then, we evaluate the effectiveness of FGSM, BIM, and DeepFool
attacks followed by the evaluation of our adversarial attack defending scheme. Last, we
evaluate our mitigation scheme in an SDN network.

5.4.1 LSTM-based Detection Model
To craft adversarial data using FDIA, we observe the normal range for each signal
from the DBC file for KIA Soul and generate a random value that follows the uniform
distribution within the interval of the normal range. For the sample that has a period of 10
seconds, we randomly choose 1 second to attack. Figure 5.5 shows an example of adversarial
data modification of TQI ACOR signal using our proposed FDIA model and its normal
signal values. It shows the signal values of the TQI ACOR from the time interval of 392
seconds to 402 seconds. On the top of Figure 5.5, it shows the normal signal values for the
TQI ACOR signal. On the bottom of Figure 5.5, it shows the signal values for TQI ACOR
with adversarial data modified at 393-394 seconds.
We implemented the LSTM-based detection model using Keras with Tensorflow backend. The LSTM-based detection model has an input layer, an LSTM layer with 128 neurons,
and an output layer. We chose Adam as the optimizer with a learning rate of 0.001. The
number of epochs is set to 50 and the batch size is set to 64. Since we have 1516 samples
for training, the number of steps in each epoch is 24. The number of steps is calculated
as

N
,
B

where N is number of training samples and B is the batch size. In our experiment,

we chose sigmoid as our activation fucntion and we used binary cross-entropy as our loss
function. The rest of the parameters are default from Tensorfolw.

The training process

was carried out on GAIVI2, which is a computer cluster with large scale parallel computing
capabilities. GAIVI2 has a TensorFlow version of 2.0. We tested with different optimizers,
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Table 5.2: Comparison Among Different Optimizers
Optimizer Accuracy Recall Precision F1 Score Time(s)
RMSprop
98.42%
0.98
0.98
0.98
83.96
Adam
99.47%
0.99
0.99
0.99
82.66
Adagrad
73.16%
0.73
0.80
0.72
83.32
SGD
64.74%
0.65
0.68
0.63
83.38

such as SGD, Adam, RMSprop, and Adagrad. Table 5.2 shows the evaluation of accuracy,
recall, precision, F1 score, and training time for different optimizers. The accuracy is the
accuracy of the unseen test set, and the Time column reports the time used to train the
model in seconds.
We can see from Table 5.2 that with Adam optimizer, we have achieved the best
performance with an accuracy of 99.47%. The recall, precision, and F1 score for the Adam
optimizer are all 0.99. RMSprop optimizer has the second-best performance with an accuracy
of 98.42%, and both recall and precision are 0.98. The time for training the model using
Adam, RMSprop, Adagrad, and SGD optimizer are 82.66 seconds, 83.96 seconds, 83.32
seconds, and 83.38 seconds, respectively. We can see that the training time is very short.
This makes AADS capable of updating the model every two minutes and performing the
detection in real-time. Compared to Khan et al. [43] our approach has better performance.
Khan et al. have the highest accuracy of 95%, precision of 0.95, and recall of 0.87, while our
approach has the highest accuracy of 99.47%, precision of 0.99, and recall of 0.99.
Figure 5.6 shows the final results of the LSTM-based detection model. The training
process runs for 50 epochs. On the top of Figure 5.6, it can be seen that we achieved a
training accuracy of 99.93% and a validation accuracy of 99.98%. We report the binary
cross-entropy loss at the bottom of Figure 5.6, where the losses are 0.0012 and 0.00096 for
training and validation, respectively.
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Figure 5.6: Evaluation of accuracy and binary cross-entropy loss.

5.4.2 Adversarial Defending Scheme
In this subsection, we demonstrate the limitation of the LSTM-based detection model
by implementing three adversarial attacks for attacking the LSTM-based detection model
obtained in the previous section. Then, we introduce our defense method.
First, we generate the adversarial example and use it to show the limitation of LSTMbased detection model. In order to keep the adversarial examples similar to the original input,
we try to choose an  as small as possible. Figure 5.7 shows the attack success rates on the
test dataset using both FGSM and BIM with different  values. In the BIM attack, we find
that we can achieve the best results when we set α = 1 and iterate five times. We can see
from Figure 5.7 that when  = 5, BIM has reached the best success rate of 99.47%. Similarly,
when  = 13, FGSM has achieved its best success rate of 98.42%. In general, the BIM attack
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Figure 5.7: Evaluation of FGSM and BIM with different .
Table 5.3: Adversarial Attacks Analysis
Method
FGSM
BIM
DeepFool

Success Rate%
98.4%
99.5%
99.5%

Accuracy%
1.6%
0.5%
0.5%


12
5
-

Time (s)
9.24
37.35
104.47

is more efficient than the FGSM attack in compromising our LSTM model. Table 5.3 shows
the success rates, accuracies, and time used to craft adversarial examples on the test dataset
for FGSM, BIM, and DeepFool. Also, the best  used for both FGSM and BIM are shown
in Table 5.3. DeepFool has a slightly better success rate, 99.5%, compared to FGSM, 98.4%.
However, it takes a longer time to create the adversarial samples.
In our adversarial attack defending scheme, we apply iterative re-training to countermeasure adversarial attacks. We choose batch size N = 200 and iterate 100 times. Figure
5.8(a) compares the test accuracy of iterative re-training against FGSM, BIM, and DeepFool, respectively. It shows that both DeepFool attack and BIM attack perform better than
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Figure 5.8: Evaluation of adversarial attack defending scheme.
FGSM to fool the LSTM model for the first 56 iterations. However, after more iterations,
our LSTM model becomes more robust. None of the attacks can reduce the performance of
the re-trained LSTM. Figure 5.8(b) shows the re-training accuracies against the DeepFool
attack at each iteration. There are training accuracies and validation accuracies. We can
see that after iteration 45, both training and validation accuracies become stable. In the
early iterations, there are some large fluctuations, which is because, for each iteration, we
randomly choose 200 samples from the training dataset and it takes some iterations to cover
all the samples in the training dataset. Figure 5.8(c) shows the re-training accuracies against
the FGSM attack at each iteration. The accuracies are evaluated on the validation set. We
can see that when we run approximately 62 iterations, the training and validation accuracies
become stable. This indicates that the FGSM attack can no longer affect our re-trained
LSTM model. Figure 5.8(d) shows the re-training accuracies against the BIM attack. When
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Table 5.4: Latency Analysis
Msg
Type
EMS11
EMS12
EMS14
EMS16
SAS11
Attack
Average

Latency (ms)
5.5490
5.7007
5.1252
5.0749
4.9052
5.8154
5.3617

Detection
Time (ms)

Mitigation
Time (ms)

1.6021

0.7991

Overall
Latency (ms)
7.9502
8.1019
7.5264
7.4761
7.3064
8.2166
7.7629

we run around 56 iterations, the training and validation accuracies become stable. Our
results demonstrate that our adversarial attack defending method can successfully defend
against FGSM, BIM, and DeepFool by iterative re-training.

5.4.3 SDN and Mitigation Scheme
A CAN message is usually broadcast periodically. Based on the timestamps recorded
in the dataset, we can find the interval at which an ECU broadcasts a CAN message is
10 milliseconds. If the overall latency of AADS is below 10 ms, we can effectively secure
the CAN bus to prevent subsequent attack messages from being broadcast. In this section,
we evaluate our SDN-based in-vehicle network transmission latency and the detection and
mitigation latency of our AADS. The transmission latency is defined as the time interval
between the time an ECU starts to send out messages and the time other ECUs receive the
messages.
In our study, the message types sent by the EMS are: EMS11, EMS12, EMS14, and
EMS16, while MDPS has SAS11 as its outgoing message. The malicious ECU sends out
adversarial messages. Table 5.4 gives the latency of each type of messages, detection time,
mitigation time, and the overall latency, where the overall latency is a sum of the latency
of one type of messages, its detection time, and its mitigation time. Furthermore, we define
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the average latency as the average of all measured latency of one type of message. As shown
in this figure, the average latency, detection time, and mitigation time are 5.3617 ms, 1.6217
ms, and 0.7991 ms, respectively. The average overall latency is 7.7629 ms, where the average
overall latency is defined as the average of all the overall latency among all the types of
messages.

5.5

Discussion
In this research, We studied the adversarial attacks and showed how easily they can

make the LSTM model failed in detecting FDIA. We proposed AADS by iterative re-training
to build a robust LSTM model. Inspired by Khan et al. [43], we implement the false data
injection attack to attack the CAN bus and build an LSTM-based detection model to detect
it. Our focus is to explore adversarial attacks to compromise the LSTM-based detection
model and propose an AADS to defend against the adversarial attacks. For the purpose
of comparison, we use the same dataset as Khan et al. It is a public dataset, which was
collected from the KIA SOUL by Hacking and Countermeasure Research Lab. We use a
generic KIA DBC file decoder from OpenDBC repository to decode the dataset. Due to
some limitations, it is difficult to get real-world datasets and conduct the experiment on
physical equipment. In a real-world scenario, there are more attacks that could happen on
the CAN bus. In our future work, we need to collect real-world data and explore physical
implementations to get more reliable results.
For comparison purposes, we reproduced Khan et al.’s approach as much as possible,
where they created a false information attack with a duration of 10 seconds for each signal.
However, 10 seconds is too long in a real-world scenario. In our future work, we need to
reduce the length of the sequence to a reasonable duration that can be applied in real-time
applications.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Work

6.1

Summary
This dissertation introduced several network attacks that can result in information

theft. By studying the characteristic of each attack, we proposed different countermeasures
to defend against them. First, we focused on domain name security and explored DGA-based
malware, which has posed many challenges in network security. The traditional blacklisting
method is not sufficient to detect DGAs since the backend servers that the attacker communicates to are always on the move. Therefore, we proposed a machine learning framework
consisting of a two-level classification and clustering model and a prediction model to defend
against DGA threats. We collected real-time threat data, in which all DGA domains were
live threats on the Internet, over one year. The proposed method can efficiently classify,
cluster, and predict DGA domains.
Next, we looked into the key reinstallation attack that poses a significant threat to
Wi-Fi security and aims to steal personal information. KRACK utilizes the weakness of the
4-way handshake to obtain the encryption key used to connect to the network. By studying
its attacking feature, we proposed an SDN-based detection and mitigation framework to
detect and mitigate KRACK. With the SDN controller, we were able to monitor and manage
the traffic with a global view of the network. The proposed framework checks the duplicated
message 3 transmission to detect KRACK. After detecting KRACK, the flow table will
update the forwarding rules to redirect the attack traffic to a splash portal.
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Then, we explored another information theft attack called a phishing attack. The
most efficient way to prevent this type of attack is to let the user be vigilant of it. To
understand how users behave when encountered with phishing attacks, we proposed two
study designs, both online and on-site. We studied how phishing types, intervention, and a
monetary incentive can affect user behaviors when facing phishing attacks. We also proposed
a machine learning model to predict how a user performs against phishing attacks. Our
results showed that people perform better with intervention and monetary incentives and
people more easily ignore senders’ email addresses that may look suspicious.
Furthermore, we studied adversarial attacks aimed at compromising machine learning
models. We showed how easily the adversarial attacks could make the machine learning
model fail in detecting false data injection in an in-vehicle network. To build a robust
machine learning model, we proposed an SDN-Based adversarial attack defending system.
The proposed AADS can efficiently detect FDIA in an in-vehicle network and ensure the
robustness of the machine learning model used to detect FDIA. In addition, the AADS will
mitigate the attack traffic to prevent false data from being transmitted.
All the evaluation results showed that our proposed methods that target different
attacks are very effective and the robustness of the machine learning model can be ensured.

6.2

Future Work
In the future, we will collect more data and expand our work on a larger scale environ-

ment. Due to limitations, some of the experiment was done in the lab. To get more accurate
results, we need to conduct more experiments on a large scale network. For the DGA threat,
we will explore more complicated DGAs that use a dictionary to generate domain names,
which make the detection harder. In a real-world scenario, there are a large number of devices connected to Wi-Fi and all users who connect to the Wi-Fi are likely to be attacked
with KRACK. So, we will explore different machine learning schemes to detect large scale

130

attacks. Also, we plan to conduct more experiments and recruit more participants to study
user behavior on other types of attacks that steal personal information, such as KRACK.
In daily life, we tend to work on many other things while checking emails. Therefore,
we will investigate a multitasking environment and try to see how multitasking will affect
user behavior when encountered by phishing attacks. Furthermore, we will explore more
techniques to ensure the robustness of the machine learning models used in our research.
We will prevent the machine learning models from being compromised by more complex
adversarial attacks. Additionally, we will look into more attack surfaces to ensure the security
of the Internet.
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